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[Note: As this comment was being typeset, the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that
sobriety checkpoints are unconstitutional under the Minnesota Constitution. See
Ascher v. Commissioner of Public Safety, No. C3-93-364, 1994 WL 314712 (Minn. June
30, 1994). The court concluded that there was no persuasive reason to dispense with
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I. INTRODUCTION
You are driving home. It's nearly 10:00 p.m. and you want to get
there in time for the evening news. You are almost home when you see
a large sign flashing a warning-"AHEAD SOBRIETY CHECK-" One
block later you are directed by uniformed police officers through traf-
fic cones into a single lane of cars that empties into a school parking
lot. As you join the line you notice camera crews from local television
stations filming motorists as they enter the checkpoint. You see the
police question drivers. They let some go, but others are sent to a
secondary area where police appear to be conducting field sobriety
tests. More camera crews are filming drivers in that area.
It's your turn. A police officer leans over, "Driver's license please."
"Had anything to drink tonight?" The officer waits for your answer,
attempting to detect the telltale odor of alcohol on your breath. He
shines a flashlight on your face to check your pupil reaction and look
for glazed or watery eyes. The television camera pans your way. In-
stead of merely watching the evening news, you might end up featured
on it.1
Stops such as this one are valid under the United States Constitution
despite the absence of suspicion that an offense has been committed. 2
In reaching this conclusion, the United States Supreme Court applies
a low level of scrutiny to sobriety checkpoints. Rather than subject
checkpoints to the rigors of traditional Fourth Amendment analysis,
the Court now gives law enforcement officials broad latitude in decid-
ing how to control the problems associated with drunk driving. At is-
the traditional individualized suspicion requirement that Minnesota courts have "long
held" to be generally required under article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution.
Id. In reaching this conclusion, Justice Coyne writing for the majority relied on the
Brennan and Stevens dissents in Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444
(1990). The court reasoned that the balancing in Sitz represented a "radical departure"
from traditional application of the test because it allowed police officers to decide for
themselves the reasonableness of their own conduct. Id. Justice Tomjanovich and
ChiefJustice Keith dissented, arguing that the challenged checkpoints would pass mus-
ter under the Fourth Amendment and that there was no reason to use the state consti-
tution to rule independently "[i]n view of the overwhelming importance of public
safety." Id. The dissent likewise noted that the Minnesota checkpoint was more effec-
tive than the Sitz checkpoint and that stops "under two minutes" were "hardly burden-
some." This Comment illustrates that sobriety checkpoints can be very burdensome
and intrusive and argues in favor of the conclusion of the majority of the Minnesota
Supreme Court that stopping drivers based on individualized suspicion is a more effec-
tive, and constitutional, method of apprehending drunk drivers.]
1. This hypothetical checkpoint is based on the facts set out in Respondent's Brief
and Appendix, Ascher v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 505 N.W.2d 362 (Minn. Ct. App.
1993) (No. C3-93-364), and Appellant's Brief and Appendix, Ascher (No. C3-93-364).
2. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (holding that
the highway sobriety checkpoint program in Michigan did not violate the Fourth
Amendment).
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2
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 9
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol20/iss2/9
SOBRIETY CHECKPOINTS
sue is the degree of intrusion by police officers that a free society will
tolerate. The United States Supreme Court reasons that, in light of the
severity of the drunk driving problem, the deterrent effect of these
stops outweighs the intrusion created.
Many state courts, dissatisfied with the federal approach, have cho-
sen to analyze the validity of sobriety checkpoints independently under
their respective state constitutions. As this public policy debate shifts
to the state level, state courts are turning to their own constitutions as
sources of broader protection for individual liberties. States are decid-
ing for themselves the extent to which an intrusion into a citizen's
right to be left alone can be justified in the name of checkpoint
benefits.
Recently, Minnesota courts addressed the question.3 In Ascher v.
Commissioner of Public Safety,4 the Minnesota Court of Appeals ruled that
sobriety checkpoints violate article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Con-
stitution.5 On the same day, however, in Gray v. Commissioner of Public
Safety,6 a different panel of appellate judges found no compelling rea-
son to justify interpreting the search and seizure provision of the Min-
nesota Constitution more expansively than the Fourth Amendment. 7
The narrow question in each case was whether permitting media cover-
age of the checkpoints impermissibly heightened the intrusion for per-
sons stopped.8 Responding to the Ascher and Gray split, the Minnesota
Supreme Court agreed, for the first time, to consider the constitution-
ality of sobriety checkpoints. 9
This Comment surveys how state courts treat sobriety checkpoints,
focusing specifically on Minnesota's experiences. Part II explores the
historical framework for Fourth Amendment analysis under the
United States Constitution. Part III illustrates how states analyze sobri-
ety checkpoints independently under their own respective constitu-
tions. Part IV recommends that states should adopt a strict standard
for analyzing search and seizures under state constitutions. Next, the
proposed strict standard is applied to the checkpoints conducted in
3. See Ascher v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 505 N.W.2d 362, 370 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1993), review granted (Minn. Oct. 28, 1993) (holding that sobriety checkpoints
violate the Minnesota Constitution); Gray v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 505 N.W.2d
357, 362 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993), review granted (Minn. Oct. 28, 1993) (upholding sobri-
ety checkpoints because there are no compelling reasons to interpret the search and
seizure provision of the Minnesota Constitution more expansively than the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution).
4. 505 N.W.2d 362 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
.5. Id. at 369-70.
6. 505 N.W.2d 357 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
7. Id. at 362.
8. Ascher, 505 N.W.2d at 366; Gray, 505 N.W.2d at 361.
9. The Minnesota Supreme Court granted review in both Ascher and Gray on Octo-
ber 28, 1993. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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Ascher and Gray pursuant to Minnesota State Patrol guidelines. Finally,
Part V of this Comment concludes that sobriety checkpoints are un-
constitutional under the Minnesota Constitution.
II. HISTORY
A. From Probable Cause to Balancing
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures absent probable cause and a search warrant.1 0 This is a funda-
mental right"a that protects individuals from unreasonable intrusions
by the government. 12 The Fourth Amendment also protects individu-
als from overbearing and harassing police conduct.13 According to the
United States Supreme Court, this right is "basic to a free society."4
Courts traditionally define probable cause as "facts and circum-
stances... sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the
belief that an offense has been or is being committed."15 Warrantless
searches were considered unreasonable except for certain "carefully
defined classes of cases." 16 In the late 1960s, however, the United
10. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment is enforced by the exclusionary rule,
which excludes at trial evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655
(1961) (applying the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule to the states via the
Fourteenth Amendment). Prior to Mapp, state constitutions were the only source of
protection against intrusions by the state. Id. at 651-53.
11. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985) (considering whether a mobile
home falls under the automobile exception to the general rule requiring a warrant for
searches).
12. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The Fourth Amendment does
not guarantee a general right to privacy; however, it does protect a person from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. Id. at 350, 359. Katz considered whether a person in a
telephone booth had a constitutionally recognized right to privacy. Id. at 349-50. The
Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. Id. at 351.
The proper focus is on the individual's expectation of privacy, not on whether a physi-
cal intrusion into a "constitutionally protected area" occurs. Id. at 350-51. See alsoTerry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968) (holding that the Fourth Amendment protects citizens
when they are out on the "streets of our cities").
13. Terry, 392 U.S. at 13-14.
14. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (quoting Wolf v. Colo-
rado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949)).
15. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIzuRE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMEND-
MENT § 3.2, at 556 (2nd ed. 1987) (quoting United States v. Davis, 458 F.2d 819 (D.C.
Cir. 1972)).
16. Camara, 387 U.S. at 528-29, 539 (recognizing the validity of warrantless searches
and seizures in "emergency situations"). Camara addressed the warrantless inspection
[Vol. 20
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States Supreme Court shifted Fourth Amendment analysis. In in-
stances where the intrustion was deemed minimal, the Court no longer
required probable cause and a warrant to justify a governmental intru-
sion; rather, it determined whether a search or seizure was "reason-
able."' 7 Moreover, the Court recognized that the Fourth Amendment
protected people, not places.18 Thus, the proper inquiry became
whether a person had a reasonable expectation of privacy that society
was willing to recognize.1 9
In focusing on the reasonableness of searches and seizures, the
Court began to substitute a balancing test for the probable cause re-
quirement. For example, in Teny v. Ohio,20 the Court first allowed war-
rantless investigative stops even though officers did not have probable
cause to make an arrest. Terry recognized that a warrantless seizure was
justified, despite the lack of probable cause, because police officers
must sometimes take "necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-
the-spot observations of the officer on the beat ... ."21 The Court
substituted a balancing test for the technical probable cause require-
ment because of the unique circumstances involved in a "stop and
frisk."22
of an apartment building that was based on a suspicion of violations of the San Fran-
cisco Housing Code. Id. at 525.
The Camara Court cited the following cases that recognized limited exceptions to
the warrant requirement: Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (holding that a war-
rantless search of a hotel room conducted without the consent of the guest or not
incident to the arrest violated the Constitution); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48
(1951) (holding that an exemption to the warrant requirement arose only incident to
the arrest or under exceptional circumstances); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20,
33 (1925) (recognizing that courts do not sanction warrantless searches of private
dwelling houses except incident to an arrest).
17. See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 9 ("What the Constitution forbids is not all searches
and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures."); Katz, 389 U.S. at 359 ("Wher-
ever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable
searches and seizures."); Camara, 387 U.S. at 528 ("[E]xcept in certain carefully defined
classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is 'unreasonable'
unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant."); see also John C. Sheldon,
Sobriety Checkpoints, the Rational-Basis Test, and the Law Court, 8 ME. BJ., March 1993, at
81 (stating that "up until the late 1960's [sic] probable cause was the only measure for
determining constitutionality under the Fourth Amendment. Since the Supreme
Court's increasing use of balancing tests has frequently resulted in its approval of the
searches or seizures in question, one may conclude that under the Rehnquist Court's
view of the Fourth Amendment the former is a means to the latter end").
18. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
19. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
20. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
21. Id. at 20. The Sitz dissent noted that prior to Sits, a balancing test was applied
only when a stop was "substantially less intrusive ... than a typical arrest. . . ." Sitz, 496
U.S. at 457 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
22. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21 (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35
(1967)). Camara rejected the argument that a housing inspector needed probable
1994]
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Balancing under the Fourth Amendment eventually evolved into the
three-prong inquiry articulated in Brown v. Texas. 23 Courts must weigh
"the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to
which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the
interference with individual liberty."
24
Some have criticized these changes, 25 arguing that the United States
Supreme Court has abandoned its traditional role as protector of indi-
vidual rights in favor of a more "majoritarian" approach to constitu-
tional analysis.26 Despite this criticism, the Court has applied its
balancing analysis to uphold random bus searches,27 profile stops at
airports,2 8 use of drug-sniffing dogs, 29 aerial helicopter searches of pri-
cause that a dwelling contained housing code violations and a search warrant before
conducting an investigative search. Camara, 387 U.S. at 534. The Court instead deter-
mined whether the inspection was "reasonable." Id. at 535. Specifically, this determina-
tion required "balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search
entails." Id. at 537.
23. 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979). Brown involved the stop of an individual spotted
walking away from another man in a drug trafficking area. Id. at 48-49. On this ground
alone, the officers stopped the defendant and asked him to identify himself. Id. at 49.
The Supreme Court held that this stop violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 53. The
Court stated, "[i ] n the absence of any basis for suspecting appellant of misconduct, the
balance between the public interest and appellant's right to personal security and pri-
vacy tilts in favor of freedom from police interference." Id. at 52.
24. Id. at 50-51.
25. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights: State Constitution as Guardians of Indi-
vidual Rights, 59 N.Y. ST. B.J. 10 (1987). Justice Brennan discusses the "retrenchment"
by the Supreme Court from its role as protector of individual rights in the post-Warren
Court era. Id. at 17. See also Thomas J. Hickey & Michael Axline, Drunk-Driving Road-
blocks Under State Constitutions: A Reasonable Alternative to Michigan v. Sitz, 28 CRIM. L.
BULL. 195, 196 (1992) (arguing that the Rehnquist Court's philosophical commitment
to "majoritarianism as the fundamental guiding principle of its criminal procedure ju-
risprudence . . . has tilted the individual rights/government authority scale heavily to-
ward the rapid expansion of government authority").
26. See Hickey & Axline, supra note 25, at 196.
27. Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2389 (1991) (holding that random bus
searches conducted pursuant to passenger's consent are not necessarily
unconstitutional).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 11 (1989) (holding that there was
valid reasonable suspicion to stop defendant at the Honolulu International Airport
based on personal characteristics that led police officers to suspect he was a drug
dealer); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 6 (1984) (upholding a stop based on the
unusual behavior of defendant at Miami International Airport which gave police an
"articulable suspicion" that a crime was being committed).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983). The canine sniff test was
justified, first, because it did not require opening luggage. Id. at 707. Moreover, the
only thing disclosed by the sniff was the presence or absence of contraband. Id. Canine
sniffs are one of a kind in this respect. Id. "We are aware of no other investigative
procedure that is so limited both in the manner in which the information is obtained
and in the content of the information revealed . . . ." Id.
[Vol. 20
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vate property,0 garbage searches,31 and routine employee drug test-
ing.3 2 In each case, the once essential requirements of probable cause
and a search warrant were lacking.33
In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 3 4 the Supreme Court also
relied on a balancing test to find sobriety checkpoints constitutional.
The next section describes the evolution of the automobile exception
to the warrant requirement that ultimately enabled the Supreme Court
to find the suspicionless stops in Sitz "reasonable" under the Fourth
Amendment.
B. The Automobile Exception
Automobile stops by law enforcement officials trigger Fourth
Amendment protection.3 5 However, in light of the mobility and perva-
sive regulation of motor vehicles, the Supreme Court has determined
that motorists on public highways have a reduced expectation of
privacy.36
The Supreme Court first considered suspicionless automobile
seizures in the context of efforts by the border patrol to detect illegal
30. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 446 (1989) (holding that an investigation
by an officer flying 400 feet over residential property in a helicopter which resulted in
discovery of marijuana plants did not constitute a "search" for which a warrant was
required under the Fourth Amendment); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215
(1986) (holding warrantless aerial searches of a fenced-in backyard are not
unreasonable).
Two district courts have gone even further to conclude that using an infrared heat-
seeking device during an aerial search to detect the presence of growing lights inside a
building does not constitute a "search" under the Fourth Amendment. See United
States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 225 (D. Haw. 1991), aff'd 984 F.2d 1053 (9th
Cir. 1993) (finding that defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in "aban-
doned" heat); see also United States v. Kyllo, 809 F. Supp. 787, 793 (D. Or. 1992) (same).
But see United States v. Casanova, 835 F. Supp. 702, 708 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that
court need not reach defendant's argument that prewarrant use of LTD to detect radia-
tion emanating from residence constituted an unreasonable search).
31. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (holding that there is
no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage placed outside in opaque bags for col-
lection by trash collector).
32. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989)
(holding that suspicionless drug testing was reasonable where Customs employees in-
volved in drug interdiction sought promotions in employment status).
33. As recently as 1975, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted that the "sole" excep-
tion to the warrant requirement was the "stop and frisk" described in Tery. State v.
McKinley, 305 Minn. 297, 232 N.W.2d 906 (1975).
34. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
35. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); United States v. Marti-
nez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555 (1976).
36. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392-93 (1985).
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aliens crossing into the United States.S7 Although initially reluctant to
sanction roving stops of motorists absent probable cause,3 8 the Court
eventually recognized that law enforcement officials had difficulty ac-
quiring probable cause under the circumstances and that they had no
other effective means to patrol the border.39 Consequently, the Court
sanctioned roving stops based on reasonable suspicion and justified
the holding by balancing the State's interest in preventing the illegal
entry of aliens against the "modest" intrusion of a stop and brief
questioning.40
The Court first upheld suspicionless seizures of motorists in United
States v. Martinez-Fuete.41 Martinez-Fuerte held that, even without prob-
able cause or reasonable suspicion, fixed border checkpoints to detect
illegal aliens were constitutional.4 2 Specifically, the Martinez-Fuerte
Court upheld suspicionless, warrantless stops of every vehicle that
passed through a fixed checkpoint.43 The Supreme Court distin-
guished fixed border checkpoints from roving patrols that required
reasonable suspicion. 44 Fixed checkpoints, the Court reasoned, would
not surprise motorists because they would know about the stop in ad-
vance.4 5 Moreover, law enforcement officers at fixed checkpoints had
less discretion over which cars to stop and where to stop them.46 The
Court rejected the argument that a warrant was required for the loca-
tion of a checkpoint and instead deferred to the judgment of law en-
37. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 (1975) (applying
the Teny reasonable suspicion standard to automobile stops); Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973).
38. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 273 (holding warrantless stops and searches of
automobiles by roving border patrols were unconstitutional absent probable cause). In
Almeida-Sanchez, the Court acknowledged that while a moving automobile could be
stopped without a search warrant, probable cause was still required. Id. at 269.
39. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 881.
40. Id. at 879-80. The intrusion was "modest" because the stops only lasted approx-
imately one minute. Id. The Court specifically rejected suspicionless stops in Brignoni-
Ponce. Id. at 882. Moreover, the Court required that the scope of any subsequent
search not exceed the reason for the stop unless the officer obtained consent or had
probable cause. Id. at 881-82.
41. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
42. Id. at 560-62.
43. Id. at 566-67.
44. Id. at 558-59 (citing Brignoni-Ponce 422 U.S. at 882).
45. Id. at 559.
46. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559.
[Vol. 20
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forcement officials.47 As a safeguard, the Court required that the
scope of any further detention must be appropriately limited.48
The United States Supreme Court considered roving stops once
more in Delaware v. Prouse.49 In Prouse, the State contended that the
stop promoted highway safety. 50 The Court applied a slightly recast
balancing test to weigh "the importance of the governmental interest
at stake, the minimal intrusion of a brief stop, and the absence of prac-
tical alternatives for policing. . . ."51 The Prouse Court concluded that
roving stops for the promotion of highway safety violated the Fourth
Amendment.52 The Court noted the absence of empirical evidence
that would support a conclusion that roving stops were effective and
reasoned that other constitutional means to achieve the goal may have
existed.5
3
47. In Martinez-Fuerte the Court distinguished Camara v. Mun. Court on the grounds
that the case involved the search of a private residence. See id. at 564-65 (drawing on
Camara, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)). In Camara the Court was unwilling to abandon the
warrant requirement in administrative searches, even where inspections were governed
by statutes and ordinances. Camara, 387 U.S. 523, 532-33 (1967). The Camara Court
reasoned that "broad statutory safeguards are no substitute for individualized review
.... "Id. at 533.
Martinez-Fuerte, on the other hand, preferred to give "wide discretion" to the Bor-
der Patrol for checkpoint location decisions because the "visible manifestations of the
field officers' authority" minimized the intrusion caused by the stops. 428 U.S. at 562-
65. The Court stated that checkpoint locations were administrative decisions that
should be left to the Border Patrol. Id. at 562 & n.15. The Court in Martinez-Fuerte did,
however, acknowledge that decisions as to location and method of operation must be
reasonable and would be subject to post-stop review. Id. at 565-66.
48. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 566-67 (citing Teny, 392 U.S. at 24-27 and Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. at 881-82 (requiring consent and probable cause before further deten-
tion is allowed)).
Justice Brennan,joined by Justice Marshall, dissented against this "continuing evis-
ceration of Fourth Amendment protections...." Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 567 (Bren-
nan & Marshall, J.J., dissenting). Brennan argued that the majority drained the Fourth
Amendment of its reasonableness requirement and was at odds with other decisions of
the Court, including Brignoni-Ponce which was decided only one year earlier. Id. at 568.
49. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
50. Id. at 658. A Delaware patrolman randomly stopped a motorist to check the
driver's license and vehicle registration. Id. at 650.
51. Id. at 655 (citing Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975)). Compare id. with
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) (weighing "the gravity of the public concerns
served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and
the severity of the interference with individual liberty").
52. P/rouse, 440 U.S. at 659.
53. Id. at 659-60. Justice Rehnquist wrote the lone dissent from the eight-justice
majority opinion. Id. at 664. Rehnquist argued that because the majority had no evi-
dence such stops did not deter unsafe driving, they had not properly weighed the effec-
tiveness of the stops. Id. at 666. He suggested that the majority "would apparently
prefer that the State check licenses and vehicle registrations as the wreckage is being
towed away." Id.
1994]
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The Prouse majority noted in dicta that the decision did not preclude
states from instituting "less intrusive" spot checking mechanisms, such
as fixed roadblocks,54 thus providing support for the Supreme Court
to subsequently uphold fixed sobriety checkpoints.
C. The "Rational Basis" Approach
Responding to the invitation of Prouse, the Supreme Court held in
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz55 that fixed roadblock sobriety
checkpoints were constitutional.56 In balancing the interests in-
volved,57 the Court for the first time deferred almost exclusively to law
enforcement officials regarding the "effectiveness" prong of the analy-
sis.58 The Sitz decision prompted a deluge of unfavorable commen-
tary59 and has been criticized for substituting a rational basis standard
54. Id. at 663.
55. 496 U.S. 444 (1990). Sitz was decided by a six-justice majority, with three
dissents.
56. Id. at 455.
57. The Court cited the balancing analysis applied in Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543
(1976), and Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979). Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452-55.
58. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453-54. ChiefJustice Rehnquist's majority opinion clarified the
prong of the Brown v. Texas test that requires balancing "the degree to which the seizure
advances the public interest." Id. (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. at 51). According to
Justice Rehnquist, this inquiry:
[W]as not meant to transfer from politically accountable officials to the courts
the decision as to which among reasonable alternative law enforcement tech-
niques should be employed to deal with a serious public danger.... [F]or
purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, the choice among such reasonable
alternatives remains with the governmental officials who have a unique under-
standing of, and a responsibility for, limited public resources, including a fi-
nite number of police officers.
Id.
59. See, e.g., B. Gordon Beckstead, Michigan's Attempt at Curbing Drunk Drivers Under
The Fourth Amendment: The Constitutionality of Sobriety Checkpoints, 6 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 147,
147 (1992) (arguing that Sitz only adds to the "tangled web of confusion" surrounding
warrantless searches); Sean F. Farley, Roadblocks to the Fourth Amendment: Michigan De-
partment of State Police v. Sitz, 13 WHITrIER L. REv. 571, 572 (1992) (contending that
Sitz was erroneously decided because "the majority failed to recognize recent cases
which required a 'special government need' before justifying shedding the protections
afforded by the Fourth Amendment"); TroyJ. Gilchrist, Michigan Department of State
Police v. Sitz: Placing a Road Block on Individual Freedom, 12 HAmLINEJ. PUB. L. & POL'Y
301, 311 (1991) (suggesting that Minnesota should invoke its own constitution in con-
sidering sobriety checkpoints and refuse to uphold them as reasonable); Hickey & Ax-
line, supra note 25, at 215 (proposing that attorneys turn to state constitutions to
challenge sobriety checkpoints);Jon M. Ripans, Michigan Department of State Police v.
Sitz: Sober Reflections on How the Supreme Court Has Blurred the Law of Suspicionless Seizures,
25 GA. L. REv. 199, 221 (1990) (indicating that Sitz "leaves open troubling questions
concerning the Court's eventual response to the prevalence of drugs in this country:
What extreme countermeasures will be warranted when drugs are factored into the
Brown test?"); Fran Small, Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz: Has the Supreme
Court Abdicated Its Role as the Protector of the Right to Be Let Alone?, 26 NEw ENG. L. REv. 583,
608 (1991) (concluding that "[t]he Sitz Court has further eroded a cherished protection
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of review in place of the stricter scrutiny applied in earlier Fourth
Amendment analysis.60
The Michigan checkpoint at issue in Sitz was set up according to
guidelines established by a Sobriety Checkpoint Advisory Committee.61
Pursuant to these guidelines, police stopped all passing vehicles and
detained drivers for closer inspection if they showed signs of
intoxication.62
The Court applied the Brown v. Texas balancing test to the Michigan
checkpoint. First, the Supreme Court found that no one could seri-
ously dispute the state's interest in deterring drunk driving.63 Turning
to the second factor, by comparison, the Court viewed the intrusion on
motorists as slight.64 The Court measured the "objective" intrusion by
the duration of the stop and the intensity of the investigation. 65 The
of the Fourth Amendment-the right to be let alone"); Nadine Strossen, Michigan De-
partment of State Police v. Sitz: A Roadblock to Meaningful Judicial Enforcement of Constitu-
tional Rights, 42 HAsTINGs L.J. 285, 285-87 (1991) (concluding that the Sitz Court has
"breached the bedrock principle that a law enforcement end cannotjustify an unconsti-
tutional means ... "); and David A. Thatcher, Michigan Department of State Police v.
Sitz: A Sobering New Development for Fourth Amendment Rights, 20 CAP. U. L. Rv. 279, 295-
96 (1991) (maintaining that the Sitz holding writes the word "reasonable" out of the
Fourth Amendment).
60. See Sheldon, supra note 17, at 81. Sheldon, a Maine District CourtJudge, char-
acterizes the Sitz majority's deference to "politically accountable officials" as "radical
stuff." Id. at 81.
If the Chief Justice intended by his deference to local officials to make the
final prong of the Brown test little more than a rational-basis test then Sitz may
be the seminal decision in a line of cases in which the Supreme Court applies
the rational-basis test of the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses to the
Fourth Amendment-with an inevitable lessening of the judicial scrutiny that
is traditionally applied to search-and-seizure issues.
Id.; see also Wayne R. LaFave, Controlling Discretion by Administrative Regulations: The Use,
Misuse, and Nonuse of Police Rules and Policies in Fourth Amendment Adjudication, 89 MICH.
L. R. 442, 475 (1990). In Professor LaFave's opinion "Sitz is rather disappointing. It
does not reflect a commitment by the Court either to take full account of relevant police
guidelines or to submit those guidelines to meaningful judicial review."; accord 104
I-HIAv. L. Rv. 129, 267 Leading Cases: The Supreme Court, 1989 Term (stating that Sitz
"marks a radical change" by transferring the reasonableness determination to the polit-
ical branches, thereby removing the "sole protection of an individual's fourth amend-
ment rights against excessive governmental action").
61. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 447.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 451. Justice Stevens argued in dissent that the drunk driving statistics
relied on by the majority were outdated and exaggerated the problem. Id. at 467 n.7
(Stevens, J., dissenting). While Justice Stevens agreed that the state has a great interest
in deterring drunk driving, he noted that the interest was no greater at the time Sitz was
decided than it was in earlier cases such as Prouse, which refused to sanction suspi-
cionless seizures. Id. at 468.
64. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451.
65. Id. at 451-52. The average delay for each vehicle stopped at the Sitz checkpoint
was approximately 25 seconds. Id. at 458. Of the 126 vehicles stopped, only two were
detained for more intensive scrutiny. Id.
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Court deemed the objective intrusion to be minimal.66 The Sitz Court
then described the "subjective" intrusion of the stop as "the fear and
surprise engendered in law-abiding motorists by the nature of the
stop."67 Because uniformed officers made the stops pursuant to pre-
established guidelines, the Court found that this "subjective" intrusion
was minimal.68 Regarding the third prong, the Sitz majority reasoned
that a 1.6% arrest rate made the Michigan checkpoint sufficiently
effective.69
In support of its decision, the majority distinguished Delaware v.
Prouse,70 where no empirical evidence suggested that random stops
promoted highway safety.71 In Sitz, the Court deferred to "politically
accountable officials" to choose which particular law enforcement
mechanism to use. 72 The Sitz majority believed that government offi-
cials could determine the most effective option in light of the limited
law enforcement resources available. 73
The Sitz dissent 74 argued that the majority both overstated the pub-
lic interest involved and understated the intrusion.75 Prior cases re-
quired at least some level of suspicion before upholding a stop, even
where the intrusion was considered minimal. 76 The dissent also ob-
jected that the majority failed to properly consider alternate enforce-
ment mechanisms. 77
Although Justice Scalia joined the six-to-three Sitz majority without
comment, in a different context he has criticized balancing tests as
tantamount to comparing "whether a particular line is longer than a
66. Id. at 451.
67. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452.
68. Id. at 453.
69. Id. at 455. Expert testimony indicated this was greater than the one percent
average achieved in other states that conduct similar sobriety checkpoints. It was also
greater than the .12% arrest rate approved in Martinez-Fuerte. Id. (citing Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. at 554).
70. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
71. Siiz, 496 U.S. at 454.
72. Id. at 453-54.
73. Id.
74. Justices Brennan and Stevens filed dissenting opinions, in which Justice Mar-
shall joined. Id. at 456, 460.
75. Id. at 456, 462-63.
76. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 457 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 661 (1979)). "By holding that no level of suspicion is necessary before the
police may stop a car for the purpose of preventing drunken driving, the Court poten-
tially subjects the general public to arbitrary or harassing conduct by the police." Id. at
458 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
77. The dissent reminded the majority that the Court approved the Martinez-Fuerte
checkpoints only because officers had no alternative means to detect illegal aliens. Id.
at 471-72.
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particular rock is heavy."78 State courts struggling to apply the Sitz
standard would likely agree with Justice Scalia's assessment of balanc-
ing tests.
Nonetheless, many state courts have relied on Sitz to uphold check-
points. 79 Other states have applied Sitz more narrowly to hold check-
points unconstitutional. 80 A third group of states, however, has turned
to an independent source of civil rights protections-state constitu-
tions.81 The following section examines the trend toward state consti-
tutional analysis that has resulted from the United States Supreme
Court's vacillation and its retreat from protection of individual
autonomy.
III. STATE CONSTITUTIONS
In 1977, Justice Brennan urged state courts to expand protection of
individual liberties under state constitutions.8 2 In light of the growing
reluctance of federal courts to enforce constitutional protections, Jus-
tice Brennan advocated greater reliance on independent state
grounds.8 3 He argued that federal decisions should not be dispositive
78. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988). Jus-
tice Scalia made this comment in connection with a Commerce Clause analysis, but the
rationale is applicable here as well.
79. See, e.g., People v. Rister, 803 P.2d 483 (Colo. 1991) (upholding three minute
stops on a road that police reasonably believed drunk drivers had previously used, and
where all vehicles were stopped and officers could not stop drivers who turned to avoid
the checkpoint); Howard v. Voshell, No. 90A-10-001, 1992 WL 179502 (Del. Super. Ct.
1992) (stating that sobriety checkpoints do not per se violate the Fourth Amendment as
long as there is no unconstrained exercise of officer discretion); Christopher v. State,
413 S.E.2d 236 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding sobriety checkpoint, set up solely in
response to complaints about a loud party, because the totality of circumstances indi-
cated that checkpoint was "authorized" and defendant was not singled out); State v.
Bolton, 801 P.2d 98 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990), cert. denied 801 P.2d 86 (N.M. 1990) (holding
that a license checkpoint roadblock was constitutional and not pretextual, even though
it involved both Border Patrol and state police officers, and officers asked permission to
search all vehicles detained for further inspection); State v. Everson, 474 N.W.2d 695
(N.D. 1991) (upholding a drug detection checkpoint conducted under the pretext of a
license check because of compelling state interest).
80. See, e.g., Galberth v. United States, 590 A.2d 990 (D.C. 1991) (holding that
roadblocks were unconstitutional for general law enforcement purposes); State v.
Kingsbury, No. A-92-403, 1992 WL 211396 (Neb. Ct. App. Sept. 1, 1992) (holding that a
narcotics checkpoint was unconstitutional because there was insufficient evidence of
effectiveness and because vehicles were stopped selectively at the discretion of officers);
State v. Wagner, 821 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that checkpoints were
unconstitutional because of the lack of legislative guidelines); State v. Sims, 808 P.2d
141 (Utah 1991) (holding that an "all purpose" checkpoint was unconstitutional be-
cause there were no guidelines established by politically accountable officials).
81. See infra parts III.A. and III.B. (citing courts that rely on state constitutions).
82. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 H v. L. REv. 489, 491 (1977).
83. Id. at 495
1994]
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of state constitutional protections because the Federal Bill of Rights
was derived exclusively from state constitutions.84 Justice Brennan reit-
erated this position in 1987, responding to the United States Supreme
Court's subjugation of individual liberties to the "ever-increasing de-
mands of governmental authority."85
Numerous commentators support Justice Brennan's advocacy for
state constitutional protection of individual liberties.8 6 One prevalent
view contends that state constitutions will only be reinvigorated when
states develop bodies of law interpreting their own constitutions inde-
pendently of the federal judiciary.87
The following discussion illustrates that, at least in the context of
search and seizure analysis, state courts are rising to Justice Brennan's
challenge.
A. Background
Until the 1960s, state constitutions were the sole source of protec-
tion of individual rights from encroachment by the state.88 During the
1960s, the Warren Court incorporated Bill of Rights protections into
the Fourteenth Amendment to make these protections applicable to
state, as well as federal, action.8 9 However, the pendulum of federal
protection for individual rights seems to have reached its peak and is
now on the downswing. The re-emergence of a federalist9O philosophy
84. Id. at 501-02.
85. Brennan, supra note 25, at 16-17. In his 1987 article, Justice Brennan focused
on the incorporation of the Federal Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment so
as to apply to encroachment by states as well as by the federal government. Id. at 12.
Brennan noted, in particular, that the Fourth Amendment "has been most clearly
targeted for attack" by the Rehnquist Court. Id. at 17.
86. For an excellent article proposing an analytical framework for bringing individ-
ual liberties challenges under the Minnesota Constitution, see Melissa Sheridan & Brad-
ford S. Delapena, Individual Liberties Claims: Promoting a Healthy Constitution for
Minnesota, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 683 (1993). See also Terrence J. Fleming & Jack
Nordby, The Minnesota Bill of Rights: "Wrapt in the Old Miasmal Mist", 7 HAMUNE L. REv.
51 (1984);Jack Nordby, Thirty-Two Reflections on the Birth, Slumber and Reawakening of the
Minnesota Constitution, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 245 (1994).
87. Sheridan & Delapena, supra note 86, at 706-07; James A. Gardner, The Failed
Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REv. 761, 771 (1992) (arguing that state
courts have failed to develop state constitutional law despite the voluminous commen-
tary in support of that approach).
88. Sheridan & Delapena, supra note 86, at 688-89.
89. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 25, at 12 ("In the years between 1961 and 1969,
the Supreme Court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to nationalize civil rights,
making the great guarantees of life, liberty and property binding on all governments
throughout the nation."); accord Sheridan & Delapena, supra note 86, at 688-90. Sheri-
dan and Delapena argue that state courts invited this expansion of federal authority by
failing to adequately protect defendants under their own constitutions. Id.
90. For a discussion of the theory of state judicial independence from federal gov-
ernment, called the "New Federalism," see Gardner, supra note 87, at 771.
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on the federal bench and an entrenched reluctance to protect individ-
ual liberties on the part of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have
caused state courts to resort to their constitutions as the primary
source of protection of individual liberties.9 1
1. Why States Rely On State Constitutions
State courts often find compelling reasons to depart from federal
constitutional analysis, which can be characterized in at least six ways.
9 2
First, and perhaps the most compelling reason for independent analy-
sis, is the fact that state constitutions are historically autonomous, even
when dormant.9 3 A second basis for independent analysis is the fact
that state constitutions frequently guarantee protections using lan-
guage that is different from that of their federal counterpart.9 4 A third
justification for recourse to state constitutions is the need to fill gaps in
federal analysis under analogous federal provisions. 95 Fourth, state
courts can resort to their own constitutions either because of dissatis-
faction with vacillating standards and lack of clear guidance from the
federal courts or simply because they disagree with the reasoning of
the United States Supreme Court on a particular issue.9 6 Fifth, state
91. Sheridan & Delapena, supra note 86, at 690.
92. See, e.g., Ascher v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 505 N.W.2d 362, at 367 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1993). The Ascher court found compelling reasons to focus on the Minnesota
Constitution because it was troubled by the Sitz Court's substantial departure from
'well-established Fourth Amendment analysis." Id.
93. Sheridan & Delapena, supra note 86, at 689-90, 718-19. Sheridan and Delapena
argue that one of the reasons state constitutions atrophied was that federal constitu-
tional law provided more protection than state counterparts. Id. at 689-90. See also
Fleming & Nordby, supra note 87, at 56-57.
94. See, e.g., State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 1990) (noting that
language in the Minnesota Constitution protecting free exercise of religion "is of a
distinctively stronger character than the federal counterpart"). In State v. Parms, 523
So. 2d 1293 (La. 1988), the Louisiana Supreme Court found Louisiana's Constitution,
like the Oregon and New Hampshire Constitutions, provided expanded protection for
individual liberties because it prohibited unreasonable invasions of privacy as well as
unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. at 1303. "Roadblocks certainly smack of police
state measures, and it is doubtful if they could ever pass muster under the Louisiana
Constitution." Id. (citing State v. Koppel, 499 A.2d 977 (N.H. 1985)).
95. Sheridan & Delapena, supra note 86, at 721. State courts can invoke this justifi-
cation where Supreme Court rulings are vague and ambiguous. Id. Also, an argument
can be made that "open-ended" provisions were intended to be clarified by the states.
Id. at 722.
96. This rationale is especially valid where the Supreme Court radically diverges
from its prior precedent. See Sheridan & Delapena, supra note 86, at 717. "State courts
are free to disagree with the reasoning underlying the Supreme Court's decision about
a particular federal provision. This is especially true in situations where new Supreme
Court cases appear to undermine the policies set forth in prior Supreme Court deci-
sions." Id. For this very reason, Minnesota independently analyzed the issue of when a
person is deemed "seized" by police under the Minnesota Constitution. See In re Wel-
fare of E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d 779 (Minn. 1993).
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courts may find that unique local conditions require independent rul-
ings regarding questions of individual liberties.9 7 Finally, the case law
and statutes of a state can necessitate independent state court
analysis.98
2. Analysis of State Constitutional Claims
When ruling on independent state grounds, a court must select an
analytical approach. At one end of the spectrum, courts may find the
state constitution coextensive with the United States Constitution and
rely on federal decisions to resolve issues of constitutionality at the
state level. 99 Because federal holdings will continue to dictate the reso-
lution of constitutional questions under this approach, this analytical
model is somewhat unsatisfactory to those who advocate the indepen-
dence and autonomy of state courts. 100
Consequently, many courts prefer to interpret their state constitu-
tions independently in order to insulate their decisions from federal
analysis.1Ol As a result, federal precedent02 and rulings from other
97. Fleming & Nordby, supra note 86, at 76. The authors find this "[p]erhaps the
most compelling basis for independently interpreting the Minnesota Bill of Rights." Id.
A state supreme court will have "superior knowledge of, experience with, and proximity
to" controversies that are local in nature. Id.
98. Sheridan & Delapena, supra note 86, at 718.
99. See, e.g., Hagood v. Town Creek, 628 So. 2d 1057, 1993 WL 333607 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1993). In Hagood a checkpoint was set up outside the Town Creek Apartments to
prevent "trouble," which was loosely defined as fighting, public drunkenness, and disor-
derly conduct. Id. at 1060. Applying Sitz, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
found that this checkpoint violated the Fourth Amendment because it was set up for
general law enforcement purposes. Id. at 1062. However, the court declined to hold
checkpoints unconstitutional under the state constitution because the language of the
state constitution was "substantially similar" to the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1062,
1063. Moreover, state precedent upholding checkpoints was validated by Sitz. Id. at
1062.
100. See Gardner, supra note 87, at 788. Gardner criticizes deference to federal anal-
ysis as being confusing, redundant, and often conclusory. Id. at 788-93.
101. See, e.g., People v. Rister, 803 P.2d 483 (Colo. 1990); State v. Parms, 523 So. 2d
1293 (La. 1988); Sitz v. Department of State Police, 506 N.W.2d 209 (Mich. 1993); State
v. Koppel, 499 A.2d 977 (N.H. 1985); Pimental v. Department of Transp., 561 A.2d 1348
(R.I. 1989); State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Sheridan and Delapena strongly urge practitioners and courts to independently
analyze state constitutional issues. Sheridan & Delapena, supra note 86, at 698-99.
Independence is not a disposition which in any way involves ignoring interpre-
tations of federal law. Rather, independence is a non-deferential stance from
which interpretations of federal law will be considered only to the extent that
federal law helps to elucidate similar state provisions.
Id. at 699.
102. Dissents and prior approaches to a particular constitutional question can be
excellent sources of persuasive analysis for state courts to follow, particularly when the
Supreme Court has radically diverged from its prior precedent. See infra note 109 and
accompanying text.
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states become persuasive, rather than dispositive, authority.103 State
courts can rely on the language and history of their own constitutions
and draw on other sources, such as state statutes, to form their analy-
ses. 104 Prior state case law that interprets the state's constitution also
provides guidance.105
When relying on state constitutions, state courts often strictly scruti-
nize sobriety checkpoints in accordance with the federal approach
prior to Sitz.106 Whether a state prefers a truly independent or more
deferential analysis, a "state court must be sure to make a 'plain state-
ment' that its decision rests on independent and adequate state
grounds."107 In this way, state courts both establish that the analysis
was done on independent state grounds and develop an autonomous
body of law explaining state constitutions.10 8
B. Sobriety Checkpoints Under Other State Constitutions
A number of courts have considered the constitutionality of sobriety
checkpoints under their state constitutions.1 0 9 Checkpoints were held
103. Sheridan & Delapena, supra note 86, at 720. Sheridan and Delapena find other
state precedent "at least as persuasive as Supreme Court precedent" because those
courts are often enforcing similar rights "unconstrained by federalism concerns." Id. at
720.
104. Id. at 714, 718.
105. Id. at 718.
106. For example, New Hampshire applied a balancing test that required the check-
point to "significantly" advance the public interest, and also required a showing that no
less intrusive means were available. See State v. Koppel, 499 A.2d 977, 981 (N.H. 1985);
see also People v. Rister, 803 P.2d 483, 490 (Colo. 1990) (holding that checkpoints must
"reasonably advance" a state interest); State v. Parms, 523 So. 2d 1293, 1303 (La. 1988)
(emphasizing the greater protection afforded individuals under the Louisiana Constitu-
tion than that found in the federal constitution); Pimental v. Department of Transp.,
561 A.2d 1348, 1350 (R.I. 1989) (recognizing the right and power of state courts to
impose higher standards on searches and seizures under state constitutions); State v.
Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 149 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (holding that any suspicionless investiga-
tory motor vehicle roadblock, conducted without legislative authorization, is per se un-
constitutional under the Utah constitution).
107. Sheridan & Delapena, supra note 86, at 700 (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032, 1041 (1983) (requiring state courts to make a plain statement when using federal
law as an interpretive aid)).
108. Id. at 706.
109. See, e.g., Rister, 803 P.2d 483 (holding checkpoint constitutional); State v. Hen-
derson, 756 P.2d 1057 (Idaho 1988) (holding that a checkpoint was unconstitutional
absent legislative authority); State v. Church, 538 So. 2d 993 (La. 1989) (holding that a
checkpoint without reasonable suspicion or probable cause violated state constitution);
Sitz v. Department of State Police, 506 N.W.2d 209 (Mich. 1993) (holding, upon re-
mand from the Supreme Court (496 U.S. 444) and the Michigan Court of Appeals (485
N.W.2d 135) that highway sobriety checkpoints violate the Michigan Constitution);
State v. Kingsbury, No. A-92-403, 1992 WL 211396 (Neb. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a
narcotic checkpoint was unconstitutional under both state and federal constitutions);
Kappel 499 A.2d 977 (finding insufficient evidence of public benefit to uphold check-
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unconstitutional in the majority of states.110 Some state courts have
required legislative authority before upholding checkpoints.a", Ha-
waii, North Carolina and Utah, for example, have enacted statutes to
regulate the conduct of sobriety checkpoints.112
A closer look at the rationales articulated by specific state courts
most effectively illustrates the independent approach each has taken.
In Rhode Island, for example, the historical underpinnings of the state
constitution provided the basis for courts to afford broader search and
seizure protection. Rhode Island courts rejected Sitz because it would
points under state constitution); People v. Rocket, 594 N.Y.S.2d 568 (N.Y. Just. Ct.
1992) (holding that DWI checkpoints are authorized under state constitution); State v.
Blackburn, 620 N.E.2d 319 (Mun. Ct. Clark County, Ohio 1993) (holding that check-
point violated both federal and state constitution); Nelson v. Lane County, 743 P.2d 692
(Or. 1987) (holding that checkpoints were invalid absent statutory authorization and
specific guidelines); Commonwealth v. Fioretti, 538 A.2d 570 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (up-
holding checkpoints conducted pursuant to statute); Pimental, 561 A.2d 1348 (holding
that checkpoints violate reasonable suspicion and probable cause requirements of state
constitution); State v. Wagner, 821 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (holding check-
point unconstitutional under both state and federal constitutions because of no admin-
istrative scheme); Sims, 808 P.2d 141 (holding suspicionless stops without legislative
authorization per se unconstitutional under state constitution); City of Seattle v. Me-
siani, 755 P.2d 775 (Wash. 1988) (holding that suspicionless stops violate state constitu-
tion); see also Harry C. Martin, The State as a "Font of Individual Liberties": North Carolina
Accepts the Challenge, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1749 (1992);James W. Talbot, Rethinking Civil Liber-
ties Under the Washington State Constitution, 66 WASH. L. Rev. 1099 (1991).
110. Courts in the following states have found checkpoints to be unconstitutional
under their state constitutions: Idaho (Henderson, 756 P.2d 1057); Louisiana (Church,
538 So. 2d 993); Michigan (Sitz, 506 N.W.2d 209); Ohio (Blackburn, 620 N.E.2d 319);
Nebraska (Kingsbury, No. A-92-503, 1992 WL 211396), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2331
(1993)); New Hampshire (Koppel, 499 A.2d 977); Oregon (Nelson, 743 P.2d 692); Rhode
Island (Pimental, 561 A.2d 1348); Texas (Wagner, 821 S.W.2d 288), review refused, (Tex.
Feb. 26, 1992); Utah (Sims, 808 P.2d 141); Washington (Mesiani, 755 P.2d 775). But see
Opinion of the Justices, 509 A.2d 744 (N.H. 1986) (finding that proposed checkpoint
legislation, if enacted, would comport with state precedent holding checkpoints uncon-
stitutional); State v. Holt, 852 S.W.2d 47 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that statewide
sobriety checkpoint is not automatically arbitrary because of absence of legislative devel-
opment plan); State v. Hubacek, 840 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (holding
whether sobriety checkpoint violates state constitution is to be determined by reasona-
bleness standard under the circumstances).
111. States requiring legislative authority include: Florida (Jones v. State, 459 So. 2d
1068 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)); Idaho (Henderson, 756 P.2d at 1061); Oregon (Nelson,
743 P.2d at 696); Pennsylvania (Fioretti, 538 A.2d at 573); and Utah (Sims, 808 P.2d at
145).
In New Hampshire, after the state supreme court held that sobriety checkpoints
were unconstitutional, the legislature proposed a bill that would require a warrant
before conducting a checkpoint. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 509 A.2d 744 (N.H.
1986). The New Hampshire Supreme Court found that the proposed legislation would
be constitutional under the state constitution. Id. at 744. As of this writing, however,
this legislation has not passed.
112. See HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 286-162.5 to .6 (1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.3A
(1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-104 (Supp. 1993).
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"shock and offend" the framers of Rhode Island's constitution if search
and seizure protection was compromised in "the interest of efficient
law enforcement."'1s Essentially, sobriety checkpoints are "too high a
price" to pay for any presumed deterrent effect.114 Instead, Rhode Is-
land prefers to rely on other means to deal with the drunk driving
problem.,15
In Utah, an appellate court focused on state precedent and unique
local conditions to require legislative authorization as a prerequisite to
sobriety checkpoints and suggested that such authorization should not
be forthcoming.116 The Utah court rejected checkpoints because state
precedent favored a warrant approach to automobile searches.]1 7
Moreover, Utah's western lifestyle "promotes a greater expectation of
privacy." 118
Michigan considered sobriety checkpoints independently under its
state constitution because it disagreed with the federal rational basis
approach.119 In Sitz v. Department of State Police,120 on remand from the
United States Supreme Court, the Michigan Supreme Court applied
state constitutional precedent to interpret the Michigan Constitution.
The court concluded that "[s]uspicionless criminal investigatory
seizures, and extreme deference to the judgments of politically ac-
countable officials is . .. contrary to Michigan constitutional prece-
dent."12l With this rejection of the federal approach, Michigan joined
113. Pimental, 561 A.2d at 1352. The court warned in this regard that "the tide of
law enforcement interest could overwhelm the right to privacy." Id. See also Catherine
M. Durning, Constitutional Law-Supreme Court Refuses to Encroach Upon Constitutional
Rights-Drunk Driving Roadblocks Unconstitutional in Rhode Island-Pimental v. Depart-
ment of Transportation, 561 A.2d 1348 (R.I. 1989), 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 439 (1990).
114. Pimental 561 A.2d at 1352.
115. Id.
116. State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 148-50 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (holding that suspi-
cionless stops without legislative authorization are per se unconstitutional under the
state constitution). See also Ronald J. Chleboski, Jr., Application of Fourth Amendment
Search and Seizure Principles to Avoidance of Police Roadblocks (Recent Developments in Utah
Law), UTAH L. REv. 137 (Winter 1991).
117. Sims, 808 P.2d at 148-50. The Sims court also asserted that its "uncritical treat-
ment" of the Sitz analysis as applied to the Fourth Amendment does not mean that it
approves, only that it defers, to the "preeminent position of the United States Supreme
Court in construing the United States Constitution." Id. at 147 n.12.
118. Id. at 150 n.18. The Utah Supreme Court has effectively declined to review the
court of appeals ruling by finding the state constitutional issue moot on appeal. See
State v. Sims, No. 910218, 1994 WL 236990 at *1 (Utah May 31, 1994). The court,
however, noted the recently enacted state legislation and recognized the court's power
to review the constitutionality of the statute. Id. at *2 n.3 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-
23-104 (Supp. 1993)).
119. See Sitz v. Department of State Police, 506 N.W.2d 209 (Mich. 1993) (holding
that sobriety checkpoints violated the Michigan Constitution).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 225.
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a growing number of states that have found checkpoints unconstitu-
tional under state constitution analyses.
The following section establishes the foundation for an independent
analysis of sobriety checkpoints under the Minnesota Constitution and
summarizes Minnesota appellate court decisions addressing the consti-
tutionality of sobriety checkpoints.
C. Sobriety Checkpoints Under the Minnesota Constitution
The Constitution of the State of Minnesota was ratified on October
13, 1857122 and was revised on November 5, 1974.123 Article I, section
10 governs search and seizure and exists today as it did in its original
1857 form. 124 With only slight variations in punctuation, this provision
is identical to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion.1 25 Minnesota included search and seizure protections in re-
sponse to the general warrants that the English government used "to
122. Election Div., Minn. Secretary of State, THE MINNESOTA LEGISLATIVE MANUAL
1993-1994, 20 (1993). The vote was 30,055 to 571 in favor of acceptance. Id. Acrimony
between Minnesota Republicans and Democrats tracks back to the Constitutional Con-
vention ofJune 1, 1857. See MINN. STAT. ANN., Julius E. Haycraft, Territorial Existence and
Constitutional Statehood of Minnesota, MINN. CONST. art. I, MINN. STAT. ANN. Vol. 1 at 151
(West 1976). Animosity over the slavery issue was so pronounced that the Republicans
and Democrats held separate sessions and refused to sign the same constitution. Id. at
152. As a result, Minnesota ratified two separate, handwritten versions of a constitution.
Id. However, they were substantially the same and were always equally obeyed and en-
forced. Id. Copies of both original handwritten constitutions are reproduced at the
beginning of Minnesota's annotated statutes. Id. at 161. See also Nordby, supra note 86;
John Simonett, An Introduction to Essays on the Minnesota Constitution, 20 WM. MITCHELL
L. Rxv. 227 (1994).
123. Election Div., Minn. Secretary of State, THE MINNESOTA LEGISLATIVE MANUAL,
1993-1994, 20 (1993). A constitutional study commission reviewed the Minnesota Con-
stitution for two years beginning in 1971. Id. The commission recommended restruc-
turing and "rewriting [the constitution] in modern language." Id. Subsequent changes
did not alter the constitution's meaning, and "the original document remains the final
authority." Id. See also Fred Morrison, , 20 WILLIAM MITCHELL L. Rlv. - (1994).
124. Id.
125. Article I, § 10 of the Minnesota Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or
things to be seized.
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 10. Compare id. with supra note 10 (reproducing the language of
the Fourth Amendment).
Commentators note with interest that the Minnesota Bill of Rights is contained
within article I of the Minnesota Constitution, in a position of priority over the articles
establishing state governmental powers. By contrast, the United States Constitution,
ratified in 1787, was not amended to include the Bill of Rights until 1791. COMMISSION
ON THE BICENTENNIAL OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES at Forward (1988).
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search any person and any place they pleased, for the purpose of dis-
covering violations of the law."' 26
Minnesota courts have a long history of interpreting article I, section
10. As early as 1905, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered a chal-
lenge to a grand jury subpoena of bank records from a bankruptcy
trustee under the search and seizure provision of the Minnesota Con-
stitution. 127 In 1911, a defendant, charged with putting scrap iron in
standing grain shocks to damage his neighbor's threshing machine,
invoked the Minnesota Constitution to suppress a warrantless search of
his property for scrap iron.128 Throughout this century, Minnesota
courts have continued to rely on and independently interpret article I,
section 10.129
Consistent with these holdings, the Minnesota Supreme Court rec-
ognizes that it may grant greater protection under the Minnesota Con-
stitution than the United States Supreme Court grants under the
Federal Constitution.130 Moreover, the Minnesota Supreme Court has
126. State v. Pluth, 157 Minn. 145, 149-50, 195 N.W. 789, 791 (Minn. 1923); see also
State v. Blackburn, 620 N.E.2d 319, 323 (Mun. Ct. Clark Cty., Ohio 1993) (noting that
the Ohio Constitution provides that general warrants "shall not be granted").
127. State v. Strait, 94 Minn. 384, 102 N.W. 913 (1905). Defendants were indicted
for accepting deposits while their bank was "unsafe and insolvent." Id. The Strait court
relied on a United States Supreme Court decision to interpret the Minnesota Constitu-
tion only because "this is as far, upon investigation, as we are able to discover an inter-
pretation of these safeguards of our American jurisprudence which protects private
papers from search or seizure. ... " Id. (relying on Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886)).
128. State v. Rogue, 115 Minn. 204, 132 N.W. 5 (1911). The court's analysis is inter-
esting. Applying Minnesota precedent, the court concluded that there was no constitu-
tional violation because the defendant was neither requested nor required to give
evidence against himself. Id. Rather, the court determined that the police officers
"found" evidence on the defendant's premises. Id. The defendant's constitutional
rights were not violated by the use of the illegally seized evidence in court because the
defendant was not "compelled to give evidence against himself." Id. The exclusionary
rule had yet to be promulgated.
129. See, e.g., In re Welfare of E.DJ., 502 N.W.2d 779, 783 (Minn. 1993) (analyzing
independently whether a fleeing defendant is seized under the Minnesota Constitu-
tion); O'Connor v.Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 402, 405 (Minn. 1979) (analyzing, under
both federal and state constitutions, a search warrant authorizing search of an attor-
ney's files for evidence of client wrongdoing); State v. McKinley, 305 Minn. 297, 232
N.W.2d 906, (1975) (applying both federal case law and state statutory and case law to
interpret article I, § 10 as applied to a suspicionless automobile search); State v. Pluth,
157 Minn. 145, 149, 195 N.W. 789, 790 (1923) (applying article I, § 10 to a warrantless
automobile search which uncovered six one-gallon jugs of intoxicating liquor);
McSherry v. Heimer, 132 Minn. 260, 261, 156 N.W. 130, 131 (1916) (relying on prece-
dent set by Minnesota and other state courts when applying article I, § 10 to a trespass
action against an officer executing a search warrant on grounds that the warrant affida-
vit lacked particularity).
130. State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722, 726 (Minn. 1985). But cf State v. Gray, 413
N.W.2d 107, 112 (Minn. 1987) (holding the fundamental right to privacy under the
state constitution does not encompass a right to engage in sodomy with a prostitute).
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stated that, when analyzing fundamental rights under the Minnesota
Constitution, it is not bound by federal holdings.131
Recently, the Minnesota Supreme Court independently analyzed
search and seizure protection in In re Welfare of E.D.J132 The court
decided the matter independently because of the recent "sharp depar-
ture" of the United States Supreme Court from the "reasonable person
under the totality of the circumstances" standard previously used to
determine whether an individual was considered seized. 133 In Califor-
nia v. Hodari D.,134 the United States Supreme Court amended this
standard to require actual restraint by the police.135 Despite the incli-
nation to "invariably turn [ ] in the first instance" to federal law to an-
swer such questions, the Minnesota court identified three reasons for
not doing so in this particular case.1 36 First, Minnesota courts have
considerable experience in applying the prior standard. 137 Next, the
court found the federal court's approach unpersuasive. 13 8 Finally, the
court found no need to depart from the prior standard.'
39
Despite this well-established history of independent search and
seizure analysis, the Minnesota Supreme Court has only recently
131. Gray, 413 N.W.2d at 111; see also, John M. Stuart, Introduction to the Minnesota
Constitutional Law of Criminal Procedure, 27th ANN. CRIM. JUST. INST. § XVIII (1992). Stu-
art considers whether the state constitution is a legitimate source of individual rights.
He argues that Minnesota case law supports the proposition that federal constitutional
law merely sets minimum standards for individual rights. Id. at 1 (citing In Re Estate of
Turner, 391 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1986)). Stuart concludes that, in the area of state
criminal justice, the Minnesota Constitution is not dead, but is only sleeping. Id. at 4.
132. 502 N.W.2d 779, 783 (Minn. 1993) (holding that the test for "seizure" under
the Minnesota Constitution is whether a reasonable person would conclude he or she is
not free to leave). Compare id. with State v. Sorenson, 441 N.W.2d 455, 458 (Minn. 1989)
(upholding the federal open fields doctrine, which permits the warrantless search of
private land).
133. In re E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d at 780.
134, 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
135. Id.
136. In re E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d at 781.
137. Id. at 782.
138. The Minnesota court viewed Hodari D. as requiring the court first to find that
the prior reasonable person standard is met, and, second, to find that the police used
physical force or asserted authority to cause the person to submit. Id. at 783. The court
stated:
Were we persuaded that the additional level of analysis is justified, we would
not hesitate to follow the United States Supreme Court's lead and interpret
the identical provision of our state constitution accordingly. However, as we
said earlier, we are not persuaded by the majority opinion in Hodari D., and we
are persuaded that there is no need to depart from the pre-Hodari D.
approach.
Id.
139. Id. at 781. The court noted that Professor LaFave criticized the change by the
United States Supreme Court in Hodari D. Id. at 783 (citing Wayne R. LaFave, "Seizures"
Topology: Classifying Detentions of the Person to Resolve Warrant, Grounds, and Search Issues,
17 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 417, 424-25 (1984)).
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agreed to address the validity of sobriety checkpoints under the Minne-
sota Constitution.140 Previous Minnesota appellate court analyses of
checkpoints have followed the shifting standards articulated by the
United States Supreme Court.141 For example, the appellate court fol-
lowed federal precedent in State v. Larson142 to strike down a "stop
when safe"143 checkpoint.1 4 4 The court reasoned that a checkpoint set
up informally by a field supervisor, whose only instructions were to
stop vehicles when it could be done safely,145 lacked the specific super-
visory instructions or guidelines required by Sitz.146 Minnesota appel-
late courts have even deferred to the federal standard when faced with
a direct state constitutional argument.' 47
Minnesota is poised to break free of any prior deference it paid to
federal sobriety checkpoint analysis. In recent decisions, two different
Minnesota appellate court panels considered applying independent
analysis under the state constitution, with conflicting results.
140. See, e.g., Ascher v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 505 N.W.2d 362, 366 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1993), review granted (Oct. 28, 1993); Gray v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 505
N.W.2d 357, 361 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993), review granted (Oct. 28, 1993).
141. See, e.g., State v. Larson, 485 N.W.2d 571, 572 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); Chock v.
Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 458 N.W.2d 692, 693 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); State v.
Muzik, 379 N.W.2d 599, 601 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
142. 485 N.W.2d 571 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
143. North Dakota upheld a "stop when safe" checkpoint on the grounds that the
stop was sufficiently systematic since it complied with state highway patrol policy and
thus limited the unbridled discretion of field officers. State v. Wetzel, 456 N.W.2d 115,
120-21 (N.D. 1990). The Larson court expressly rejected this holding. Larson, 485
N.W.2d at 573.
144. Larson, 485 N.W.2d at 572-73 (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979); and
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979)).
145. Larson, 485 N.W.2d at 572. Specifically, "troopers would pull over and check
the 'next clear vehicle that we could pull in without causing a traffic hazard.' " Id.
(quoting from the testimony of Trooper Jacqueline Sticha).
146. Id. at 573. The court was looking for "specific guidelines limiting discretion."
Id.
147. SeeChockv. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 458 N.W.2d 692, 694 (Minn. Ct. App.
1990) (upholding sobriety checkpoint conducted pursuant to guidelines). The Chock
court considered for the first time whether Minnesota could find independent state
grounds to rule that sobriety checkpoints were unconstitutional absent reasonable sus-
picion. Id. at 694. The court did not address this issue other than to say that the legisla-
ture was free to set guidelines limiting sobriety checkpoints but, absent such legislation,
the court would follow the United States Supreme Court. Id.
In an unpublished opinion written shortly after Chock, the appellate court again
declined to rule on this issue, deferring to the Minnesota Supreme Court's power to
declare broader liberty interests under the state constitution. See Sanders v. Commis-
sioner of Pub. Safety, Nos. C1-89-2108, C3-90-26, 1990 WL 128305, at *2 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1990), review denied (Oct. 25, 1990).
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In Ascher v. Commissioner of Public Safety,148 the Minnesota Court of
Appeals held that a wholesale, suspicionless seizure violated article I,
section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution.149 The court first applied
the federal standard to find that the checkpoint violated the Fourth
Amendment because representatives of the media were allowed to film
the stops. 150 The court also independently analyzed the checkpoint
under article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution. The "tele-
vised police inspections" contravened "the Minnesota conception of
ordered liberty."15, The court rejected the United States Supreme
Court's balancing of the invasiveness and effectiveness prongs of the
test in Sitz because it "departed substantially from well-established
Fourth Amendment analysis."152 In addition, the Ascher decision lik-
ened the televised checkpoint inspections to the use of stocks in colo-
nial times.153
In Gray v. Commissioner of Public Safety,154 issued on the same day, a
different appellate court panel took a contrary position to find no
compelling reasons to consider sobriety checkpoints independently
under state law.155 The court, stating that Minnesota courts had fol-
lowed federal precedent in prior checkpoint cases, found "no compel-
ling reasons that require . . . diverge[nce] from the Supreme Court's
decision in Sitz .... "56
The following part recommends that the Ascher-Gray split be resolved
by adopting a strict balancing test to determine the validity of sobriety
checkpoints under the Minnesota Constitution. If adopted, this strict
test would apply to the checkpoint guidelines established by the Min-
nesota State Patrol. Under the proposed balancing test, these check-
point guidelines likely would be unconstitutional. Minnesota should
148. 505 N.W.2d 362 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993), review granted (Oct. 28, 1993). In
Ascher, an individual was stopped at a sobriety checkpoint where television media were
both invited and present. Id. at 363.
149. Id. at 370.
150. Id. at 364-66.
151. Id. at 369.
152. Id. at 367. Instead, the court relied on Justice Steven's dissent in Sitz and on
Delaware v. Prouse and State v. Muzik to analyze whether there were more effective means
to deal with the problem of drunk driving than sobriety checkpoints. Id. at 367-68
(citing Sitz, 496 U.S. at 473; Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657 (1979); and State v.
Muzik, 379 N.W.2d 599, 603-04 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)).
153. Ascher, 505 N.W.2d at 369. As the court noted, stocks were used "to ridicule and
make spectacles of those citizens who have offended community standards of behavior."
Id.
154. 505 N.W.2d 357 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993), review granted (Oct. 28, 1993).
155. Id. at 362. Appellants urged the court to adopt the balancing standard set out
in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967). Id.
156. Id. (citing Larson, 485 N.W.2d at 572-73; Chock, 458 N.W.2d at 693-94). The
court thus rejected appellant's suggestion that the Court follow the standards set out in
Camara, Id.
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align itself with the growing number of states that rely on alternative
law enforcement techniques to deal with the problems associated with
drunk driving.
IV. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Search and Seizure Protection Should Be Independently Analyzed Under
the Minnesota Constitution
Minnesota should decide the constitutionality of sobriety check-
points independently under the state constitution for several reasons.
First, throughout the state's history, the Minnesota Constitution has
been considered autonomous. Minnesota has applied article I, section
10 to search and seizure challenges since the early part of this cen-
tury. t 57 In a prohibition-era case, State v. Pluth,158 the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that under the Minnesota Constitution police of-
ficers needed a search warrant to search an automobile for intoxicat-
ing liquor after making a suspicionless stop.' 59 With this tradition in
mind, the Minnesota Supreme Court must approach the sobriety
checkpoint issue knowing that the court need not rely on federal con-
stitutional analysis.
Second, Minnesota has a unique interest in controlling its own crim-
inal laws and local law enforcement activities. 160 Exercise of police
powers is traditionally a function of states.1 61 Further, highway safety is
pervasively regulated by state statute in Minnesota.' 62 As a result, Min-
nesota continually refines and revises its drunk driving laws to make
them more effective.1 6 3 For example, in 1992, laws were amended to
157. See supra notes 119, 127-29 and accompanying text.
158. 157 Minn. 145, 195 N.W. 789 (1923).
159. 157 Minn. at 151-52, 195 N.W.2d 791.
160. See, e.g., State ex rel. Rasmussen v. Tahash, 272 Minn. 539, 553-55, 141 N.W.2d 3,
13-14 (1965) (establishing procedures for pretrial suppression hearings where search
and seizure challenges are raised). Rasmussen established procedures to facilitate reso-
lution of constitutional problems at the state trial court level. Id. at 552-54, 141 N.W.2d
at 12-13. The court recognized that trial courts need to efficiently administer the crimi-
nal law in compliance with the growth in federal decisions "giving greater viability to
Federal constitutional rights." Id. Rasmussen illustrates the difficulty state courts en-
counter when enforcing criminal laws in compliance with changing federal standards.
161. See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (16 Wall.) (1873). "Police power"
was characterized in the Slaughter-House Cases as securing the social order by subordinat-
ing private interests to the general interests of the community. Id. at 62. The United
States Supreme Court thus recognized that states had the power to enact laws regulat-
ing the health, safety and welfare of its citizens, including "those which respect turnpike
roads." Id. at 63 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824)). See also Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967).
162. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. chs. 160-174A (1992) (regulating highways and roads).
163. In 1988 the legislature added subdivision 3(a) to MINN. STAT. § 169.121 (1988)
to impose mandatory minimum penalties on habitual DWI offenders. 1988 MINN. LAWS
ch. 408, § 1 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 169.121(3), subd. a (1992)). Like-
19941
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impose a one-year license suspension on drivers who refused to take a
breath test1 64 and to establish a mandatory fifteen-day waiting period
before they could obtain a temporary license.1 65 Moreover, Minne-
sota's Department of Public Safety1 6 6 has the statutory authority to es-
tablish motor vehicle inspection programs for "unsafe motor vehicles
and motor vehicle equipment." 16 7 Pursuant to this statutory authority,
the Minnesota State Patrol has promulgated unpublished guidelines
for conducting sobriety checkpoints.1
68
Thus, Minnesota courts should independently review checkpoints
because the state's executive and legislative branches already exten-
sively regulate this area of the law.169 Presumably, Minnesota courts,
applying the Minnesota Constitution, are in a better position than the
United State Supreme Court to assure that state policies toward drunk
wise, in 1989, MINN. STAT. § 169.123 was amended to add that a person who refuses
testing for intoxication is subject to criminal penalties. 1989 MINN. LAws ch. 290, art.
10, § 5 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 169.123(2), subd. b(2) (1992)).
164. MINN. STAT. § 169.123(4) (1992). Compare id. with Heddan v. Dirkswager, 336
N.W.2d 54 (Minn. 1983). When Heddan was decided in 1983, test failure resulted in a
90-day license suspension, and test refusal resulted in only a six-month suspension. Id.
at 60.
165. MINN. STAT. § 171.30(2), subd. a(1) (1992). Compare id. with Heddan v. Dirk-
swager, 336 N.W.2d at 60 (stating, "[a] limited license is generally available immediately
upon application by a first offender"). See generally Davis v. Commissioner of Pub.
Safety, 509 N.W.2d 380, 392 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993), review granted, (January 21, 1994)
(rejecting a due process challenge to changes in Minnesota's implied consent laws).
The Davis court disagreed that police officers need to advise suspects of the conse-
quences of refusing a breath test. Id. 386-87. Rather, "the limited right to counsel is
the main protection" when an officer invokes the implied consent law. Id. at 387. The
court likewise rejected defendants' argument that "the implied consent statute has be-
come so punitive and so intertwined with the criminal DWI prosecution that it is now
itself a criminal proceeding." Id. at 390. Davis has been called the court's "most expan-
sive ruling on drunken driving in several years." See Donna Halvorsen, Police Needn't
Fully Advise Drunk Drivers, Court Rules, STAR TRIB. (Mpls.), Nov. 30, 1993, at 5B.
166. The Department of Public Safety is part of the executive branch of the state
government, and the commissioner is appointed by the governor. See Election Div.,
Minn. Secretary of State, THE MINNESOTA LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 1993-1994, 20 (1993).
The department is responsible for law enforcement, traffic safety, liquor control, fire
safety, driver and vehicle licensing, emergency management and public safety informa-
tion. Id.
The State Patrol is a subdivision of the Department of Public Safety. The State
Patrol is charged to "provide traffic safety and law enforcement on highways and free-
ways, assist motorists at accidents, and inspect school buses and commercial vehicles."
Id.
167. MINN. STAT. § 169.771(2) (1992).
168. General Order PO 90-25-001, "Driver/Vehicle Checkpoints," effective Oct. 1,
1990.
169. Fleming and Nordby argue persuasively that, because most criminal prosecu-
tions occur at the state level, independent interpretation of constitutional protections is
"perhaps most important and appropriate in the area of criminal procedure." Fleming
& Nordby, supra note 87, at 74.
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driving do not impinge on the reasonable expectations of privacy held
by Minnesotans.
Third, Minnesota has one of the lowest drunk driving related traffic
fatality rates in the United States. 170 Minnesota's drunk driving statis-
tics, when compared to those of other states, clearly illustrate that
there is no uniformity among the states for dealing with drunk drivers.
This state has developed its own laws and policies to successfully ad-
dress the drunk driving problem; it should likewise rule independently
on the constitutionality of these mechanisms.
For all of these reasons, sobriety checkpoints should be indepen-
dently analyzed under the Minnesota Constitution. Minnesota courts
are in a unique position to understand and properly balance the needs
of Minnesota's citizens and law enforcement agencies.
B. Strict Scrutiny Should Be Applied to Search and Seizure Challenges
Brought Under the Minnesota Constitution
Once a state court has decided to consider the validity of state action
under its state constitution, it must then select the appropriate analyti-
cal model. Sources of alternative analyses include the case law of other
states, prior federal case law, federal dissents, and decisions of the par-
ticular state's own courts. 1 7 1
Minnesota has a long history of applying the strict scrutiny standard
to search and seizure challenges.172 Although Minnesota courts have
applied the Sitz balancing test in recent search and seizure analyses,173
170. OFFICE OF TRAFnC SAFETY, MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, MINNE-
SOTA MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH FACrs 1992 4 (1992) [hereinafter CRASH FACrS].
171. See supra Part III.A.2. (discussing the bases for independent analysis under state
constitutions).
172. In State v. Pluth, 157 Minn. at 100, 195 N.W. at 791, the Minnesota Supreme
Court recognized that the Minnesota Constitution prohibited searches under "general
warrants." Id. General warrants, which allowed officers to search any person or place
they pleased, were used by the English government to both discover violations of the
law and to enforce and collect "obnoxious imposts and taxes." Id. Search and seizure
provisions in the state and federal constitutions were adopted to prohibit these "fishing
expeditions" by law enforcement officials. Id.
173. Minnesota appellate courts have struck down two sobriety checkpoints relying
on Sitz. See, e.g., Ascher, 505 N.W.2d at 369-70; State v. Larson, 485 N.W.2d 571, 572-73
(Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a "stop when safe" rule violates the Fourth Amend-
ment by giving too much discretion to law enforcement officials).
Minnesota appellate courts also have upheld three checkpoints since Sitz was de-
cided. See, e.g., State v. Wold, 506 N.W.2d 676, 678 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that
a sobriety checkpoint does not violate the Fourth Amendment when its location is se-
lected at the administrative level); Gray, 505 N.W.2d at 362 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993);
Chock v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 458 N.W.2d 692, 694 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990)
(holding that a sobriety checkpoint conducted pursuant to guidelines did not violate
the Fourth Amendment).
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decisions prior to Sitz relied on a stricter approach.17 4 Consequently,
the analysis for the strict balancing test in suspicionless seizures has
already been developed by both the federal and Minnesota courts.
Hence, the approach is ripe for adoption-or, more appropriately, res-
urrection-by the Minnesota Supreme Court under the state
constitution.
Minnesota courts should apply a test that weighs the gravity of the
public concern, 7 5 the severity of the interference with individual lib-
erty,' 7 6 and the productivity of the checkpoint against the intrusion.177
In analyzing the third factor, the court should consider whether alter-
native, less intrusive mechanisms are available to achieve the same
goal.178 Moreover, courts should consider the substantial risk that the
174. O'Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400 (Minn. 1979) (holding that search of an
attorney's office pursuant to a warrant violated article I, § 10, in spite of contrary fed-
eral precedent, because the Minnesota Constitution provides greater protection); State
v. Pluth, 157 Minn. 145, 195 N.W. 789 (Minn. 1923) (holding that an officer must have
cause sufficient to justify a warrant before conducting a warrantless search). However,
Minnesota courts did not require that relevant, illegally seized evidence must be ex-
cluded at trial. Pluth, 157 Minn. at 153-54, 195 N.W. at 792-93; State v. Rogne, 115
Minn. 204, 132 N.W. 5 (1911); State v. Strait, 94 Minn. 384, 102 N.W. 913 (1905).
Nevertheless, in more recent analyses, Minnesota courts have applied the exclu-
sionary rule more rigorously than the federal courts. See, e.g., State v. Albrecht, 465
N.W.2d 107, 109 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that the federal "good faith excep-
tion" does not apply under the Minnesota Constitution); State v. McCloskey, 453
N.W.2d 700, 701 n.1 (Minn. 1990) (refusing to address the federal "good faith" excep-
tion to the exclusionary rule where officers relied on a warrant).
175. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979).
176. Id.; see also Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Courts should keep in mind when evaluating the intrusiveness of sobri-
ety checkpoints that checkpoints are "usually operated at night at an unannounced
location. Surprise is crucial to [their] method." Id. at 460.
177. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659.
178. State v. Muzik, 379 N.W.2d 599, 604 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) ("The State failed to
produce any evidence which demonstrated either the need for the more intrusive
method or the superiority of checkpoints."); see also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. 543, 557 (1976) (noting that it was "impractical" to identify illegal aliens based
on reasonable suspicion while traveling in vehicles on inland routes).
See also Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the
Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1173 (1988). Stros-
sen notes that the Supreme Court already requires this element in balancing tests ap-
plied to claims involving freedom of speech and association, free exercise of religion,
right to privacy, and procedural due process rights. Id. at 1210. Strossen concludes
that "the least intrusive alternative requirement is a logically necessary element of any
reasonableness standard," including reasonableness under Fourth Amendment balanc-
ing. Id. at 1238-39. Strossen argues that even if alternative means are less effective,
"logic still dictates that the decreased effectiveness be weighed against the increased
protection of individual privacy and freedom." Id. Elevating law enforcement effi-
ciency over the protection of individual rights "invert[s] the proper relationship be-
tween governmental and individual interests embodied in the Bill of Rights." Id.
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scope of suspicionless searches and seizures might expand beyond
their initial justification.179
The following part applies the strict scrutiny standard to the check-
points conducted in Minnesota pursuant to the guidelines established
by the State Patrol.
C. Applying Strict Scrutiny to Sobriety Checkpoints Conducted in
Minnesota
Prior to Ascher, which held that sobriety checkpoints were unconsti-
tutional under state law,18 0 Minnesota law enforcement officials con-
ducted checkpoints pursuant to guidelines promulgated by the State
Patrol.18s
1. The Minnesota State Patrol Guidelines
The Minnesota State Patrol has promulgated unpublished guide-
lines for conducting sobriety checkpoints.18 2 The State Patrol estab-
lished the sobriety checkpoint guidelines to promote "the safety of
those using the public highways" and to deter "the unsafe operation of
motor vehicles upon the highways of the State of Minnesota."1 8 3 The
guidelines purport to "identify persons who are operating a motor ve-
hicle with defective equipment, without valid driver's licenses and/or
operating while under the influence of alcohol or drugs."1
8 4
179. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968). In Terry, the Court reasoned:
The sole justification of the search in the present situation is the protection of
the police officer and others nearby, and it must therefore be confined in
scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or
other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer.
Id. at 29. See also Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-82 (1975) (requiring that the scope
of any subsequent search does not exceed the reason for the stop unless the officer
obtained consent or had probable cause).
180. Following the Ascher decision, sobriety checkpoints were discontinued. See, e.g.,
More Troopers to Patrol Roads This Weekend, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS DISPATCH, Sept. 3,
1993, at 2B (announcing that 20% more officers will be patrolling the roads "in lieu of
sobriety checkpoints, whose constitutionality has been questioned"); Labor Day Weekend
DW! Roadblocks Canceled After Conflicting Court Rulings, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS DISPATCH,
Sept. 1, 1993, at 2B ("Instead of checkpoints, officers will be assigned to roving patrols
across the state.")
181. See, e.g., Jill Hodges, Drivers on Drugs are New Target, STAR TRIB. (Mpls.), Aug. 24,
1992, at IA (reporting from a checkpoint on July 30, 1992 at 7:00 to 11:00 p.m. where
"drug recognition experts" detained 650 automobiles resulting in seven citations for
possession of marijuana, but no DUI charges); Tim Nelson, St. Paul Sobriety Checkpoint
Nets 20 Drivers Who Weren't, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS DISPATCH, Sept. 20, 1992, at 4B;
Patrol on Lookout This 4th, ST. PAUL PIONEER PREss DISPATCH, July 3, 1992, at 4B (an-
nouncing that state troopers will work 105 shifts on seatbelt and speed limit enforce-
ment and conduct several sobriety checkpoints across the state).
182. General Order PO 90-25-001, "Driver/Vehicle Checkpoints," Oct. 1, 1990.
183. Id. at 1.
184. Id.
1994]
29
Bartell: Giving Sobriety Checkpoints the Cold Shoulder: A Proposed Balanci
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1994
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
The guidelines specify the following procedures for operation of a
sobriety checkpoint in Minnesota:
a. Location: "Location, date, times, and operating procedures...
must be predetermined and approved by a member of supervisory
rank." 18 5 The State Patrol must consider several factors in choosing
a location: safety and visibility; whether there is ample room for pa-
trol personnel; whether there are safe areas for secondary screening;
and whether favorable weather conditions are expected.18 6 More-
over, the "[I] ocation must [provide a] minimum opportunity for vehi-
cles to avoid or escape the checkpoint."18 7 Officers may inform local
media that the checkpoints are in operation, but the actual location
must remain confidential in order "to increase the deterrent
effect."1
88
b. Warning Signs- To set up a checkpoint, officers must post "ade-
quate and appropriate warning signs."1 89 If a motorist "obviously"
tries to evade the checkpoint, officers have probable cause to stop
and check the vehicle. 190
c. Selection: "Vehicles must be systematically selected by type
(truck or passenger vehicle) and/or number (all vehicles, every third
vehicle, every tenth vehicle)." 19 1 If the checkpoint causes a traffic
backup, the "operation will be temporarily discontinued."1 92 During
the "initial inspection," a driver must display his or her driver's li-
cense, and the patrol personnel will look "for any signs of driver im-
pairment, or other indicators of alcohol or drug use."193 The initial
inspection "should be thorough, yet brief causing minimum delay to
the motorist."
194
d. Secondary Inspection: Secondary inspection is only permissible if
an officer has probable cause to believe that a driver "is in violation
of the law."' 95 However, a "violation of the law" is not limited to
driving under the influence of alcohol. Rather, "[e]vidence of [any]
criminal activity . . . may be legally seized by troopers if located
within the parameters of 'open view' or other legal methods of
search." 1 9 6
185. Id. at 2.
186. Id.
187. General Order PO 90-25-001, "Driver/Vehicle Checkpoints," at 2.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 3.
190. Id. at 4.
191. Id. at 3.
192. General Order PO 90-25-001, "Driver/Vehicle Checkpoints," at 4.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 4.
196. Id.
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2. Analysis of Sobriety Checkpoints Conducted Pursuant to
Minnesota's Guidelines
a. Magnitude of the State's Interest
Unquestionably, drunk driving is a grave public interest in Minne-
sota. Even states that disagree about the constitutionality of sobriety
checkpoints concur in the magnitude of the public interest in deter-
ring drunk driving.1 97
As a result of Minnesota's efforts to control this problem, the per-
centage of alcohol-related fatalities in Minnesota is declining.19 8 The
most recent state statistics in Minnesota show that alcohol-related inju-
ries and fatalities are as low as they have been since the state started
recording these figures in 1984.199
While the cause of this decline is unlikely to be determined with any
exactitude, a combination of factors provide the rational explanation.
Most would concede that increasing the drinking age from eighteen to
twenty-one has contributed to the decline. Statistics indicate that DWI
arrests of eighteen-year-olds have dropped over the last ten years in
Minnesota, while arrests of twenty-five- to twenty-nine-year-olds rose
during the same period.200 From these figures, one may infer that
keeping alcohol away from teenagers has helped ameliorate the drunk
driving problem. Moreover, there are fewer teenage drivers, sug-
gesting that the "aging of the baby boom has reduced crash
incidence." 201
197. Decisions that uphold the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints are almost
conclusory on this point. See, e.g., People v. Rister, 803 P.2d 483, 487 (Colo. 1990) ("It is
beyond debate that drunken driving is a serious problem"); Christopher v. State, 413
S.E.2d 236, 237 (Ga. 1991) (taking verbatim from Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451, on the "serious-
ness" prong and adding no further comment); Chock, 458 N.W.2d at 694 ("Minnesota
has a compelling interest in battling the effects of drunk drivers.").
Courts that hold checkpoints unconstitutional likewise recognize the severity of the
drunk driving problem. See, e.g., State v. Parms, 523 So. 2d 1293, 1301 (La. 1988) ("It is
undisputed that the state and the public have a vital interest in deterring and detecting
drunken driving.").
198. CRASH FAcTs, supra note 169, at 36. In 1992, 38% of fatal car accidents and
13% of injuries were alcohol-related. Id. at 36, 39. By comparison, in 1984, 52% of fatal
accidents and 19% of injuries were alcohol-related. Id.
199. Id.
200. CRASH FAcTs, supra note 170, at 37. In 1982, 1,327 18-year-olds were arrested
for DWI. By 1991, this figure dropped to 740. Id. By comparison, the same statistic for
25-to-29 year-olds jumped from 5,229 in 1982, to 7,332 in 1991. Id.
201. Id. at 2.
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Other factors contributing to the decline in alcohol-related injuries
and fatalities include: safer cars, 202 safer roads,203 more effective DWI
laws,204 and the mandatory safety belt law.205
Even though Minnesota appears to be making strides toward con-
trolling the problem, drunk driving remains a grave public concern.
Thus, the first prong of the balancing test, the significance of the state
interest, is met under the proposed strict balancing test.
b. Severity of the Interference With Individual Liberty
One of the more controversial issues in the sobriety checkpoint de-
bate is the extent of permissible intrusiveness. Checkpoint proponents
argue that a "brief" stop is only a minimal intrusion. 206 Opponents
contend that surprise checkpoints, operated at unannounced locations
under cover of night, constitute a substantial intrusion.207 The oppos-
ing view is particularly compelling because there are inadequate safe-
guards to govern the poststop investigation. Under the strict scrutiny
standard proposed here, courts must carefully consider the severity of
the interference with individual liberty that sobriety checkpoints
impose.
Arguably a brief stop of perhaps thirty seconds208 is minimally intru-
sive.209 However, as the cases illustrate, many checkpoint stops involve
202. For example, airbags and seatbelts are now common equipment on new cars.
Id. at 1.
203. Id. at 2.
204. Id.
205. See CRASH FACTS, supra note 170, at 1-3.
206. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451.
207. Id. at 468-69 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens characterizes nighttime
checkpoints as the "hallmark of regimes far different from ours." Id. at 469.
208. See, e.g., State v. Wagner, 821 S.W.2d 288, 290 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991). Texas
strictly limits the duration of checkpoint stops. Id. Pursuant to Texas guidelines, of-
ficers were allowed only 15 seconds to determine whether drivers were intoxicated. Id.
The officers were allowed to ask two questions: (1) whether the person had been drink-
ing an alcoholic beverage; and (2) whether he or she was taking medication or using
drugs. Id. The Texas court held the Wagner checkpoints unconstitutional because they
were not conducted pursuant to legislatively adopted guidelines. Id. at 291.
209. Stops lasting an average of 25 seconds, where drivers were "briefly examined for
signs of intoxication," were upheld in Sitz. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 447-48. See also Christopher
Slobogin &Joseph E. Schumacher, Rating the Intrusiveness of Law Enforcement Searches and
Seizures, 17 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 183 (1993).
Slobogin and Schumacher recruited 217 volunteers to rank various scenarios on an
"Intrusiveness Rating Scale." Id. at 186. "Stopping drivers at a roadblock for 30-second
questioning at night" to determine drunkenness ranked 14th on their scale. Id. at 188.
To put this in perspective, the least intrusive law enforcement technique (rating 1 on a
50 point scale), was "looking in foliage in a public park" in search of a murder weapon.
By comparison, the most intrusive (rating 50) was a "body cavity search at the border"
for drugs. Id. at 189.
These results are interesting, but should not be relied on too heavily. The number
of people tested was small. Moreover, the 217 volunteers included University of South-
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much more delay than thirty seconds. How intrusive is a stop that lasts
not thirty seconds, but three minutes,
21 0 or ten minutes, or more?2t1
A checkpoint may be more intrusive at night than in the light of
day.212 In addition, a driver potentially risks encountering more than
one checkpoint during a single night or trip.2 13 Devices such as "pas-
sive alcohol sensors" of which the driver is unaware may make a stop
more intrusive. 2 14 The intrusion to those singled out for subsequent,
"secondary," inspection also must be fully considered.215 Any intru-
sion, however minimal, is arguably improper to detect drivers who
either have outstanding warrants for parking tickets2l 6 or are driving
ern California undergraduate students from a course in law and society (79), University
of Florida law students (52), citizens from Gainesville, Florida (25), and Australian law
students (61). Id. at 186. Only 25 of the test participants were drawn from the general
community, while the vast majority tested were students participating in some type of
legal study.
210. Respondent's Brief and Appendix at 5, Ascher (No. C3-93-364) ("The longest
recorded delay to any driver was 3 minutes."); Chock, 458 N.W.2d at 693 (stops averaged
2.3 minutes); see also Rister, 803 P.2d at 487 (average stop lasted 3 minutes).
211. See, e.g., State v. Everson, 474 N.W.2d 695, 702 (N.D. 1991). The North Dakota
court held that stops lasting three to ten minutes were still valid where drivers were
questioned only if "suspicions were aroused." Id. Drivers at this checkpoint were told
to produce their license and registration. Subsequently, officers referred vehicles to
either an "inspection" area or a "search" area, depending on whether any "illegal activ-
ity was observed." Id. at 697.
212. Most Minnesota checkpoints are conducted in the middle of the night. See
Respondent's Brief and Appendix at RA 3, Gray (Nos. C6-93-262, CX-93-264); see also
State v. Church, 538 So. 2d 993, 994 (La. 1989) (discussing a Louisiana checkpoint that
was conducted from midnight to 3:00 a.m.); State v. Blackburn, 620 N.E.2d 319, 321
(Mun. Ct. Clark Cty., Ohio 1993) (discussing an Ohio checkpoint that was conducted
from 9:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m.).
213. State v. Muzik, 379 N.W.2d 599, 604 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (noting that drivers
could potentially encounter multiple checkpoints during a single drive if "various state
municipalities" were free to simultaneously operate checkpoints).
214. See INSURANCE INSTITUTE FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, Why Sobriety Checkpoints Matter
and How To Make Them Work Even Better, 28 STATUS REPORT 1 (Nov. 27, 1993). This
article describes a device called a "passive alcohol sensor" that looks exactly like a police
officer's flashlight. Id. at 4. The "flashlight" is held about six inches from a driver's
mouth. As the driver speaks, a pump inside the sensor draws an air sample through a
fuel cell that generates an electric current indicating the presence of alcohol. Id. The
article argues that "[p]assive alcohol sensors can help police conduct effective check-
points without running afoul of restrictions on breath tests because [other devices] re-
quire drivers to blow into a test device." Id. at 4-5. The article does not consider the
constitutional ramifications of the "secret" surveillance it advocates.
215. See Respondent's Brief and Appendix at RA5, Ascher (No. C3-93-364) (noting
that officers stop measuring the duration of the stop once a driver is diverted for fur-
ther screening). The Louisiana Supreme Court has criticized checkpoints on this
ground. See, e.g., State v. Church, 538 So. 2d 993, 997 (La. 1989) (noting that evidence
of the duration of stops did not take into account the length of time drivers were de-
tained for further inspection).
216. See, e.g., St. Paul/i 9 Arrested in Drunken-Driving Raid, STAR TRIB. (Mpls.), May 9,
1993, at 2B (reporting "19 drivers were arrested for drunken driving, outstanding war-
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without insurance.217 Are checkpoints more intrusive when officers
cite drivers for drug possession or other nondriving related violations
of the law?2 18 Under the Minnesota State Patrol Sobriety Checkpoint
Guidelines, turning to avoid a checkpoint gives officers probable cause
to stop a driver, which can present additional problems.219 These ex-
amples illustrate that checkpoints inevitably involve much more than a
brief stop. The problem of linedrawing is immediately apparent and
irreconcilably linked to the debate.
Once a court determines the severity of the interference with indi-
vidual liberty, the interference must be weighed against the other fac-
tors of the balancing test.220 Courts that uphold checkpoints often
rants, invalid licenses or lack of insurance coverage" at the checkpoint); 3 Motorists Cited
For Drunken Driving at Medina Stop, ST.AR TRIB. (Mpls.), March 16, 1992, at 5B (reporting
that of 300 motorists stopped at checkpoint, seven were cited for outstanding warrants,
possession of drugs, or driving with either revoked or expired driver's licenses).
217. See, e.g., Respondent's Brief and Appendix at RA4, Gray (Nos. C6-93-262, CX-
93-264). The "activity breakdown" for the Gray checkpoint reveals that, while 21 motor-
ists were cited for DWI, 12 were cited for insurance violations, and 34 for driver's li-
cense violations. Id.
218. Jill Hodges, Drivers on Drugs are New Target, STAR TRiB. (Mpls.), Aug. 24, 1992, at
IA. This checkpoint processed 650 vehicles, but no DUI charges resulted. However,
officers did issue seven citations for possession of marijuana. Id. at 12A. See also Tim
Nelson, St. Paul Sobriety Checkpoint Nets 20 Drivers Who Weren't, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS
DISPATCH, Sept. 20, 1992, at 4B. In a September 18, 1992 St. Paul checkpoint, 800
vehicles were checked. Of those checked, 40 were towed away, half because their driv-
ers were intoxicated and half for other violations or because the drivers had warrants
for their arrest. Id.
219. General Order PO 90-25-001, "Driver/Vehicle Checkpoints," (Oct. 1, 1990) at
4. Other state courts have rejected this approach, and so should Minnesota. See How-
ard v. Voshell, 621 A.2d 804 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992) (holding that there was no reason-
able suspicion to justify stopping a motorist making a U-turn to avoid roadblock); State
v. Powell, 591 A.2d 1306 (Me. 1991) (holding the stop of a vehicle that turned around
to avoid a roadblock was not based on a reasonable suspicion that the driver was trying
to avoid the roadblock); State v. Talbot 792 P.2d 489 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (holding
that avoiding a roadblock did not give officers reasonable suspicion to stop motorists).
But see Snyder v. State, 538 N.E.2d 961 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that a driver's
attempt to avoid a roadblock gave rise to reasonable suspicion authorizing a stop); State
v. Hester, 584 A.2d 256 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (holding that the constitution-
ality of a checkpoint does not depend on giving motorists an opportunity to avoid it);
State v. Thill, 474 N.W.2d 86 (S.D. 1991) (holding that a motorist making U-turn to
avoid roadblock gives officer reasonable suspicion to stop).
220. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 457 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argued in Sitz
that the majority failed to properly weigh this prong of the balancing test. Id. As Bren-
nan noted, deciding that an intrusion is minimal is just the beginning, not the end, of
the analysis. All it means is that a balancing test, rather than probable cause analysis, is
required. Brennan argued that the Sitz majority conclusively found that because the
intrusion was minimal, the state's interest automatically outweighed the individual's.
Id.
The Sitz majority attempted to dismiss concerns about the intrusiveness of check-
points by differentiating between their "objective" and "subjective" intrusion. Id. at 451-
53. The majority measured the "objective" intrusion by the duration of the stop and the
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require officers to operate the checkpoint pursuant to guidelines. 22 1
Guidelines presumably minimize the intrusiveness of checkpoints by
limiting officer discretion. 222 Minnesota's guidelines, however, do not
prevent arbitrary and harassing police conduct because they do not
adequately limit the discretion of officers in the field.223
The proper focus of search and seizure analysis centers on whether
an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is violated. 224 Min-
nesotans need not, and should not, expect to be caught up in general
law enforcement dragnet operations. Simply put, a violation of a mo-
torist's expectation of privacy is not less offensive simply because the
police did it "by the book." A closer look may reveal that Minnesota's
guidelines are better characterized as "window dressing" than a safe-
guard that comports with constitutional protections. 2 25
Minnesota checkpoints are conducted by officers at unannounced
locations at night.226 While the guidelines require officers to "be thor-
intensity of the subsequent investigation. Id. at 452. The "subjective" intrusion, on the
other hand, was measured by the "fear and surprise" generated in "law-abiding motor-
ists." Id.
221. For example, Sitz reasoned that, if officers operate checkpoints pursuant to
guidelines promulgated by "politically accountable officials," the "subjective" intrusion
is minimal. Id. at 453-54. LaFave states in this regard, "[t]he Supreme Court in Sitz
made no effort to examine all the existing guidelines with a view to measuring just how
slight and free of arbitrariness would be the intrusions made under the Michigan pro-
gram." 4 LAFAvE, supra note 11, § 10.8, at 10-11 (Supp. 1994).
222. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453-54; see also State v. Parms, 523 So. 2d 1293, 1302 (La.
1988) (finding, in rejecting roadblocks, that the "discretion of the officers in the field
was not governed by neutral criteria and the cars were not stopped in a systematic way,
violating the precepts and dicta in Delaware v. PNruse"); State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 146
(Utah 1991) (reasoning that under Sitz, politically accountable officials "are responsible
for performing the initial balancing between the fourth amendment and the interests
served by the plan").
223. See supra Part IV.C.I.d. The guidelines expressly allow officers to employ
'open view' or other legal methods of search" once drivers are detained for secondary
inspection. General Order PO 90-25-001, "Driver/Vehicle Checkpoints," (Oct. 1,
1990) at 4. Officers are expressly permitted to search for evidence of any legal viola-
tion, not just those associated with drunk driving. Id. For these reasons, the guidelines
do not prevent officers from exploiting checkpoints for general law enforcement pur-
poses. Contra Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453-54.
224. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
225. See, e.g., State v. Church, 538 So. 2d 993, 996 (La. 1989) (noting that, while a
'surface analysis" of the Louisiana checkpoints suggests that they comply with the fed-
eral standard, "closer analysis" shows that the checkpoint guidelines may have been
'mere 'window dressing' "). Id. at 996, n.9.
226. See, e.g., Gray v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 505 N.W.2d 357, 359 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1993) (operating checkpoint from 10:00 p.m. until 2:00 a.m.); Ascher v. Commis-
sioner of Pub. Safety, 505 N.W.2d at 362, 363 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (operating check-
point from 10:00 p.m. until 2:00 a.m.); Chock v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 458
N.W.2d 692, 693 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (stopping defendant at checkpoint at 1:23
a.m.); Sanders v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 1990 WL 128305 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990)
(operating checkpoint from 12:15 a.m. until 2:30 a.m.); State v. Muzik, 379 N.W.2d 599,
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ough, yet brief causing minimum delay to the motorist,"2 27 they do
acknowledge that traffic may become backed up.228 In practice, the
actual individual duration of these stops is not clear. For example, in
Ascher the recorded delays ranged from one to three minutes.229 How-
ever, of the 975 drivers going through the Ascher checkpoint,2 30 the
officers recorded the duration of only eight stops. 23 1 There is no way
to verify whether the eight stops the officers chose to measure were
representative of the delay experienced by the other 967 drivers.
Additionally, officers at the Ascher checkpoint did not calculate the
duration of these stops based on the actual beginning and end of the
intrusion. Rather, to reach the one-to-three minute average, officers
measured the delays in Ascher from the time "vehicles approached the
entrance of the pre-screening area .... " 23 2 The correct time frame to
measure, however, is from the driver's first encounter with the flashing
warning sign that announced the checkpoint until the driver is free to
leave.233
The officer who logged the Gray delays testified that he measured
between "the time vehicles approached the entrance of the pre-screen-
ing area and the time the vehicles left the pre-screening area."234 This
inadequately measures the "objective" intrusion of the checkpoint.
The evidence miscalculates the duration of the stops for drivers who
600 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (operating checkpoint from 10:00 p.m. until 2:00 a.m.); see
also Opinion of theJustices, 509 A.2d 744, 745 (N.H. 1986) (reviewing proposed legisla-
tion that would require general notice of checkpoints, without disclosure of the precise
location, in order to maximize the deterrent effect).
227. General Order PO 90-25-001, "Driver/Vehicle Checkpoints," (Oct. 1, 1990) at
4.
228. Id. When delays occur, "the operation will be temporarily discontinued." Id.
229. Appellant's Brief and Appendix, Ascher at 4 (No. C3-93-364).
230. Id.
231. Id. at A-25. Of these eight, four lasted one minute, three lasted two minutes,
and only one lasted three minutes. Id.
232. Respondent's Brief and Appendix at 3, Gray (Nos. C6-93-262, CX-93-264). In
Ascher, the delays were calculated from the time "the motorist first encounters the traffic
slowdown." Appellant's Brief and Appendix at A-25, Ascher (No. C3-93-364).
233. The standard for when a person is "seized" under the Minnesota Constitution is
whether a reasonable person in the same circumstances would conclude that he or she
was not free to leave. See In re Welfare of E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d 779, 781-82 (Minn. 1993).
The Minnesota Supreme Court gave the "following examples of circumstances that
might indicate a seizure, [including] " ... the threatening presence of several officers,
the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the
citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the
officer's request might be compelled." Id. at 781 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544, 554-55 (1980)).
234. Respondent's Brief and Appendix at 3, Gray v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety,
505 N.W.2d 357 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
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are released after preliminary screening and does not account for driv-
ers who are detained for further investigation.235
Not only is the length of the suspicionless stop an important consid-
eration, courts also must carefully scrutinize the events that occur after
the stop. The Sitz Court declined to address the constitutionality of
events subsequent to the initial checkpoint stop except to note that
reasonable suspicion "may be" required in order to search further.236
This gap in the federal analysis invites states to develop their own anal-
yses for this crucial, unaddressed element of checkpoints.
2 37
As previously addressed, one substantial risk of checkpoints is that
officers may use the opportunity to look for violations of the law unre-
lated to drunk driving. 23 8 As early as the 1920s, Minnesota recognized
that these types of searches present the same evils as do general war-
rants.2 3 9 Officers at sobriety checkpoints should not be able to use
dragnet operations to probe for violations of the law or to "collect ob-
noxious taxes" under an unconstitutional general warrant.240 Never-
theless, this unconstitutional general warrant issues when officers at
checkpoints cite drivers for nondrunk driving related violations such as
expired tabs, arrest warrants for parking tickets, and expired driver's
licenses. 241
In fact, the Minnesota State Patrol guidelines expressly authorize of-
ficers to legally seize evidence of other criminal activity discovered dur-
ing a checkpoint stop.242 This guideline provision violates both
Minnesota precedent and persuasive federal analysis. Minnesota
courts have recently held that once a motorist who was stopped for a
valid reason has been exonerated, the police cannot continue the in-
235. See, e.g., State v. Church, 538 So. 2d 993 (La. 1989). The Louisiana Supreme
Court noted:
Although the initial time for the stop of a noncited motorist was short, this
does not take into account those drivers that were subjected to field sobriety
tests and allowed to proceed, or those that failed field sobriety tests and were
found to measure less than .10% by a chemical test.
Id. at 997.
236. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450-51. But see Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 563 (finding constitu-
tional the detention of some vehicles for further inspection). LaFave notes that Marti-
nez-Fuerte did not require a showing of reasonable suspicion to justify detaining drivers
for further investigation. See 4 LAFAvE, supra note 11, § 10.8(d) at 84-85. LaFave sug-
gests that reasonable suspicion should be required with sobriety checkpoints because
the intrusion is greater. Id.
237. Sheridan & DeLapena, supra note 87, at 701-04.
238. See infra notes 238-40 and accompanying text (discussing nondrunk driving
violations cited during Minnesota checkpoints).
239. See supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
240. State v. Pluth, 157 Minn. 145, 151-52, 195 N.W. at 791.
241. See supra note 236.
242. General Order PO 90-25-001, "Driver/Vehicle Checkpoints," (Oct. 1, 1990) at
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trusion.243 Likewise, one of the safeguards the United States Supreme
Court imposed in Terry v. 0hi0244 for patdown searches following a rea-
sonable suspicion seizure was to strictly limit the scope of the search to
its initial justification.245
Many of the citations issued at Minnesota checkpoints have been to-
tally unrelated to drunk driving. Minnesota checkpoints have been
used for general law enforcement purposes and to collect obnoxious
taxes. Thus, Minnesota's experience indicates a substantial likelihood
that checkpoints will be exploited for these general purposes even
though such purposes extend beyond the limited justification for the
checkpoints. 2 46
Even where checkpoints are conducted pursuant to guidelines, law
enforcement officers' authorization to choose the location contributes
to the intrusiveness of checkpoints. 2 47 In fact, the primary difference
between border stops and sobriety checkpoints is that the latter are set
up in unannounced locations and purely at the discretion of police
officers.248 A court may find that a checkpoint is unconstitutional
243. State v. Hickman, 491 N.W.2d 673 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); see also State v.
Schinzing, 342 N.W.2d 105, 111 (Minn. 1983) (holding that an officer cannot imply
that the motorist's vehicle will be searched even if the driver does not consent).
244. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
245. Id. at 30-31 (allowing a patdown based solely on concern for the safety of the
investigating officer); see also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975)
(reasoning that, since its holding was based on a requirement of reasonable suspicion
before roving stops were upheld, the scope of the search requirement set out in Teny
should apply); State v. Blackburn, 620 N.E.2d 319, 322 (Mun. Ct. Clark Cty., Ohio
1993) ("Seizures are permitted based upon reasonable articulable suspicion of wrong-
doing for purposes limited to the scope of the basis for the original seizure which, if not
pretextual, may provide the basis for further investigation and detention.") (citing
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). Cf. State v. Everson, 474 N.W.2d 695 (N.D. 1991).
The North Dakota court held in Everson that a purported license and registration
checkpoint was valid, even though its primary purpose was to arrest "drug trafficking"
motorists that were traveling to an annual motorcycle rally. The checkpoint's "opera-
tion order" stated that, should "probable cause present itself, "the officers should take
advantage of it to search vehicles." Id. at 696, 700-01. North Dakota's approach should
be rejected because it makes a law enforcement mechanism of questionable constitu-
tionality even more invasive.
246. The Sitz dissent also recognized that "those who have found-by reason of prej-
udice or misfortune-that encounters with the police may become adversarial or un-
pleasant without good cause will have grounds for worrying at any stop designed to
elicit signs of suspicious behavior." Sitz, 496 U.S. at 465.
247. See 4 LAFAvE supra note 11, § 10.8 (d), at 77-78. LaFave cites Martinez-Fuerte dicta
that indicates checkpoints may be challenged on grounds that the discretion in locating
the checkpoint was exercised unreasonably. Id. (citing Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,
564-66 (1976)).
248. Justice Stevens argued, in his Sitz dissent, that because of the arbitrary aspect,
the Michigan checkpoint was more analogous to prior decisions regarding random
stops. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 463. Stevens maintained that, because sobriety checkpoints are
unexpected, the element of surprise and potential distress is much greater than when a
motorist confronts a border checkpoint. Id.
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merely because field officers have too much discretion in locating the
stops. 249 Arguably, Minnesota law enforcement officials have abused
their discretion when selecting checkpoint locations. The police tend
to operate the Minnesota checkpoints in the urban areas around the
Twin Cities.250 However, over seventy-two percent of fatal crashes in
Minnesota occur in rural areas.
251
As this discussion illustrates, sobriety checkpoints entail more than a
"minimal" intrusion. Guidelines do not sufficiently minimize the in-
trusiveness of checkpoint seizures. Minnesota's compelling state inter-
est in deterring drunk driving does not clearly outweigh the
suspicionless intrusion of sobriety checkpoints.
c. A Comparison Between the Effectiveness of Checkpoints and
Other Law Enforcement Procedures
Perhaps the most debated aspect of checkpoints is whether they are
truly effective and, if so, to what degree. Proponents argue both that
law enforcement officials are in the best position to evaluate methods
for deterrence of drunk driving and that checkpoints are a strong de-
terrent. Opponents counter that no empirical evidence indicates that
checkpoints have any deterrent effect and argue that resources are bet-
ter spent on traditional methods of enforcing drunk driving laws.
The Sitz Court upheld a checkpoint that resulted in an arrest for
driving under the influence for 1.6% of the drivers stopped.
252 Sitz
reasoned that law enforcement officials are in a better position to
judge which techniques are most effective and cost efficient.2 53 While
this may be true, courts must not allow law enforcement officials to
decide questions of constitutionality under the guise of efficiency.
254
249. 4 LAFAVE supra note 11, § 10.8(d), at 76-78.
250. For example, the Ascher checkpoint was in Burnsville. Ascher, 505 N.W.2d at
363. The Gray checkpoint was in St. Paul. Gray, 505 N.W.2d at 359. The Chock check-
point was conducted in Blaine. Chock, 458 N.W.2d at 692. See also St. Paul/19 Arrested in
Drunken-Driving Raid, STAR Tam. (Mpls.), May 9, 1993, at 2B (reporting checkpoint con-
ducted at Johnson High School parking lot in East St. Paul); Jill Hodges, Drivers on
Drugs Are New Target, STAR TRn. (Mpls.), Aug. 24, 1992, at 1A (reporting checkpoint
conducted in Bloomington).
251. CRAsH FAcrs, supra note 170, at 24.
252. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
253. Id. at 453-55.
254. LaFave states in this regard that "Sitz is rather disappointing, for it does not
reflect a commitment by the Supreme Court either to take full account of relevant
police guidelines or to submit those guidelines to meaningful judicial review." 4
LAFAVE, supra note 11, § 10.8, at 10 (2d ed. Supp. 1994). LaFave is further critical of
the conclusory characterization of checkpoints in Sitz as a "reasonable alternative law
enforcement technique." Id.
Minnesota courts, to date, have required empirical evidence of checkpoint effec-
tiveness. See Larson, 485 N.W.2d at 573; Chock, 458 N.W.2d at 694.
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The checkpoints in Minnesota have produced similarly meager re-
sults. For example, in Gray, twenty-one DWI arrests resulted from 716
vehicles stopped, 255 representing 2.93% of all drivers stopped.256 One
officer testified that this was "one of the most productive [checkpoints]
we have conducted."2 57 Approximately sixty officers were required to
make those twenty-one DWI arrests.2 58 Likewise, in Ascher, fourteen
DWI arrests resulted from 975 vehicles stopped,2 59 representing 1.4%
of drivers stopped.260 Arguably police officers would be more efficient
if they stopped drivers based on reasonable suspicion.261
Checkpoint proponents also argue that the deterrent effect justifies
the intrusion. 262 This argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. First,
the deterrent effect of sobriety checkpoints is an elusive quality not
255. Gray v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 505 N.W.2d 357, 359 (Minn. Ct. App.
1993).
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. (stating that 26 to 30 officers were sworn in and an equal number were on
reserve).
259. Ascher v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 505 N.W.2d 362, 363 (Minn. Ct. App.
1993).
260. Id. at 365. See also State v. Church, 538 So. 2d 993, 997 (La. 1989) (finding that
a 1.36% citation rate was of questionable effectiveness).
261. See CRASH FAcrrs, supra note 170, at 36 (noting that police officers made 37,261
drunk driving arrests in 1990 and 33,574 in 1991). Compared to the handful of drunk
driving arrests resulting from checkpoint stops in Minnesota, these statistics illustrate
that police officers have been quite successful stopping drunk drivers based on reason-
able suspicion.
262. The Sitz Court argued that drunk driving accident rates have gone down be-
cause states have been experimenting with sobriety checkpoints. Michigan Dep't of
State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 n.* [sic] (1990); see also Rister, 803 P.2d 483, 488-89
(Colo. 1990) (reasoning that, even though no drunk driving citations resulted from the
Colorado checkpoint, the absence of citations, in itself, was evidence that the check-
point "undoubtedly had some effect on advancing the state's interest in preventing
drunken driving").
The Sitz dissent effectively counters this deductive assertion:
The Court's analysis of [effectiveness] resembles a business decision that meas-
ures profits by counting gross receipts and ignoring expenses. The evidence
in this case indicates that sobriety checkpoints result in the arrest of a fraction
of one percent of the drivers who are stopped, but there is absolutely no evi-
dence that this figure represents an increase over the number of arrests that
would have been made by using the same law enforcement resources in con-
ventional patrols.
Sitz, 496 U.S. at 469.
Commendably, Minnesota has never succumbed to the theory that the possibility
of discovering illegal activity justifies an unlawful search. See, e.g., State v. Pluth, 157
Minn. 145, 152, 195 N.W. 789, 792 (1923) ("A search which is unlawful when it begins is
not made lawful by the discovery that an offense has been committed."). While check-
points are not as yet "unlawful" in Minnesota, this Comment argues that such a conclu-
sion is necessary to maintain the Minnesota tradition of providing protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
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susceptible of any hard, quantitative measurement.263 Second, even if
checkpoints have some deterrent effect, the deterrence does not out-
weigh the intrusion. 264
Balancing is the greatest threat to the constitutional protections at
stake where an analysis minimizes the intrusion and exaggerates the
effectiveness of the police operation. 26 5 Weighing "individual liberty"
against "law and order" is impossible because they involve different
kinds of interests.266 Therefore, these interests must necessarily be
subjected to the neutral standard of the constitution.267 The constitu-
tion "embodies the judgment that protecting all citizens against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures outweighs society's interest in
apprehending and convicting criminals."268 For these reasons, Minne-
sota should carefully consider whether the price of the intrusion of
263. In Pimental v. Department of Transp., 561 A.2d 1348 (R.I. 1989), the Rhode
Island court stated:
Even assuming that roadblocks may have some deterrent effect, we believe
that it is purchased at too high a price. Doubtless other devices may also in-
crease the effectiveness of law enforcement, including punishment without
trial, repealing of the privilege against self-incrimination, dispensing with the
right to confrontation of witnesses, and elimination of trial byjury. Such tech-
niques, however, would diminish the rights of all in order to secure the pun-
ishment of a few.
Id. at 1352. See also State v. Church, 538 So. 2d 993, 997 (La. 1989) (noting that, since
drunk driving arrests decreased every year prior to the implementation of checkpoints
conducted by state police officers, the decline could not be attributed to checkpoints).
The Church court went on to comment that reliance on an assumed deterrent effect is
the type of "stealthy encroachment" by police officers against which courts must protect
citizens. Id. (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886)).
264. See, e.g., Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1978). The potential for crime preven-
tion did not sway the Brown Court if, to achieve this result, officers could stop and
demand identification from people traveling in "neighborhood[s] frequented by drug
users." Id. at 52. "In the absence of any basis for suspecting appellant of misconduct,
the balance between the public interest and appellant's right to personal security and
privacy tilts in favor of freedom from police interference." Id.
265. See, e.g., State v. Church, 538 So. 2d 993, 997 (La. 1989) (noting that reliance
on an assumed deterrent effect is the type of "stealthy encroachment" by police officers
that courts must protect citizens against).
266. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, Gates, "Probable Cause," "Good Faith, "and Beyond, 69 IowA
L. REv. 551, 613 (1984). Kamisar, a University of Michigan Professor of Law, so charac-
terized these interests in analyzing whether the exclusionary rule has a deterrent effect
on police misconduct. Id. Professor Kamisar concluded that adopting a "good faith"
exception to the exclusionary rule would "make it look.., less like a constitutional rule
and bring its ultimate demise one step closer." Id. at 614. Given the United States
Supreme Court's search and seizure decisions in the last ten years, Professor Kamisar's
fear of the exclusionary rule's "ultimate demise" arguably applies to the Fourth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution. Id. See supra notes 25-33 and accompanying
text.
267. See Kamisar, supra note 263, at 613.
268. Id.
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sobriety checkpoints is worth the benefit of an illusory deterrent
effect.26
9
In the absence of evidence demonstrating that sobriety checkpoints
are more effective than other law enforcement techniques, 270 Minne-
sota can employ other means to deter drunk driving without compro-
mising its law enforcement efforts. One known effective method is to
stop automobiles where police suspect that an individual driver is in-
toxicated.271 This method has proven to be effective in Minnesota,
and as evidenced by the 33,574 drivers that police arrested for drunk
driving in 1991.272 Other ways to improve highway safety include de-
signing safer roads,2 73 safer cars, 2 7 4 and both toughening and enforc-
ing drunk driving laws.27 5 In fact, driver inattention, distraction,
failure to yield the right of way, and speeding cause the majority of
accidents in Minnesota.27 6 The Minnesota Department of Public
269. The St. Paul Pioneer Press has editorialized that, since experts question the
deterrent value of checkpoints, "[i]n the battle against drunken driving, there must be
care not to needlessly add basic liberties to the wreckage." Editorial, Don't Add Civil
Liberty To DWI Victim List; Shouldn't We Require That a Constitutionally Suspect Enforcement
Strategy be Profoundly Beneficial Before We Accept It, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Sept. 6, 1993,
at 10A.
270. See, e.g., State v. Muzik, 379 N.W.2d 599, 602-04 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
Although the court in Muzik acknowledged the public's grave concern with drunk driv-
ing, it noted there was no empirical evidence that checkpoints are more effective than
seizures based on individualized suspicion. Id. at 604. The Muzik court reasoned that
most courts required some empirical evidence that either (1) the checkpoint is more
effective than stops based on individualized suspicion, or (2) it has a deterrent effect
evidenced by lowering the incidence of alcohol-related accidents. Id. at 602-03 (citing
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1979)). In Muzik, the court found no empiri-
cal evidence showing the checkpoint was a superior enforcement mechanism. Id. at
604.
271. See id. at 604; see also State v. Church, 538 So. 2d 993, 997 (La. 1989). This is
also the approach advocated by the Sitz dissent. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz,
496 U.S. 444, 460 (1990) (Stevens,J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argues that there is no
way of knowing how many drunk driving arrests would have resulted if all of the officers
involved in the Michigan sobriety checkpoint had spent a proportionate amount of
time using "more conventional means" to apprehend drunk drivers. Id. at 461-62.
272. CRASH FAcrs, supra note 170, at 37. See also State v. Blackburn, 620 N.E.2d 319,
321 (Mun. Ct. Clark Cty., Ohio 1993) (noting that a solo police officer would normally
make two to three arrests during a weekend night shift).
273. CRASH FAcrs, supra note 170, at 1-2.
274. Id. (noting that airbags and safety belts help to reduce or eliminate injuries
when accidents do occur).
275. Id. at 2. "Minnesota has been a leader among the states in the development of
innovative drunk driving countermeasures. The Legislature made significant amend-
ments to the DWI law in 1971, 1976, 1978, and in almost every year of the 1980s." Id.
See also State v. Blackburn, 620 N.E.2d 319, 324 (Mun. Ct. Clark Country, Ohio 1993)
(suggesting drunk driver hit lists and telephone tip lines as alternatives).
276. CRASH FAcTS, supra note 170, at 1-2.
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Safety has cited improvement in these areas as contributing to the car
crash decline in Minnesota in recent years.
27 7
The empirical evidence demonstrates that Minnesota does not need
to rely on means of questionable constitutionality to effectively deal
with the problem of drunk driving. Sobriety checkpoints are not suffi-
ciently effective to justify the substantial intrusion they entail. When
strict scrutiny is applied, the necessary conclusion is that the check-
points conducted in Minnesota violate article I, section 10 of the Min-
nesota Constitution.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has turned its determination of
Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" into a constitutional highwire
act. Minnesota and other states must carefully consider whether they
are going to join in this analytical circus or provide their own safety
net. Minnesotans deserve more than mere rational basis review of so-
briety checkpoints. In light of the history, tradition, statutes, and case
law of this state, Minnesota courts should independently consider the
constitutionality of checkpoints and apply a strict balancing test.
To address the problem of drunk driving while protecting the citi-
zenry, Minnesota and other states must reject suspicionless roadblock
seizures under state constitutions. In Minnesota, this kind of intrusion
into the right to be left alone violates article I, section 10 of the Minne-
sota Constitution. This is not a question of interpreting a vague or
implied state constitutional right. The Minnesota Constitution explic-
itly prohibits unreasonable seizures. This protection shapes our under-
standing of freedom and liberty. State supreme courts can affirm this
protection and assure individuals of their rights by finding sobriety
checkpoints unconstitutional under their state constitutions.
Applying strict scrutiny, the checkpoints recently conducted in Min-
nesota are clearly unconstitutional. In conformity with Brown v.
Texas2 78 and other federal and state precedents, Minnesota must re-
quire police officers to rely on mechanisms other than suspicionless
seizures for the prevention of drunk driving. Alternative means to
prosecute drunk driving effectively address this grave public concern
without an intrusion into the individual's right to be left alone. Where
these nonoffensive, effective mechanisms are readily available, they,
rather than sobriety checkpoints, must be used to minimize drunk
driving in Minnesota.
Cynthia R. Bartell
277. Id. at 2.
278. 443 U.S. 47 (1978).
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